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By DAVID. WALKER1
INTRODUCTORY
The Institute began to carry out research into
the economic aspects of the finance of Local
Authorities in September, i96i. The present Paper
represents the first fruits of this work and is very
much a Preliminary Survey; it is concerned with
only a part of the whole field and even in the part
chosen for examination it is recognised that the
analysis is incomplete. Indeed, the Paper does
little more than sketch the general background to
the "research and indicate some of the problems that
are being examined. In view of the present public
interest in the subject it was thought useful to make
available this " Preliminary Survey " at the present
time rather than wait for the full results of the work
now being done.
The scope of the Paper is limited in many ways.
First, and most obviously there is no discussion of
the very extensive spending on Loan Account of
Local Authorities which amounted to £8.7 million
in i96o/6i and which was as much as £I7.7 million
in i953/54
, 
or with the way in which such expendi-
tures are financed. The Paper is concerned only
with the expenditure and incorrie on Revenue
Account of Local Authorities, which are taken to
be those Authorities whose accounts are summarised
in the Returns oftLocal Taxation which is published
each year by the ~Department of Local Government.
The Authorities dealt with in these Returns include
the County Councils, County Borough Councils,
Borough and Urban District Councils, Town
Commissioners, separate Public Health Authorities,
Joint Mental Health Boards, Joint Burial Boards
and sundry other joint bodies. Secondly, the Paper
avoids historical and administrative and legal
1The writer wishes to acknowledge the help and advice he
has received by way of comments on earlier drafts from many
people. Needless to say these friends bear no responsibility for
the errors and imperfections that may remain or for the
opinions expressed.
matters. In an introductory Paper this hardly needs
defence ; for it is so easy in this field not to see key
economic and public finance points because they
are hidden behind a great mass of other material.
For similar reasons detailed descriptive material
concerning such matters as the different sorts of
grant which are made available from the Central
Government to the Local Authorities and concern-
ing the large number of exemptions and remissions
granted to particular types of ratepayer has been
avoided. Thirdly, discussion and argument in the
Paper is, on the whole, carried out on the assump-
tion that the present structure of Local Government
continues to exist and that Local Authorities
continue to perform the services that they are now
performing. It is recognised that an examination of
such fundamental issues as whether the number of
administrative counties should be reduced, or
whether particular services at present provided by
local Authorities would not be better carried out
by other government bodies, or whether Local
Authorities should be asked to shoulder new
responsibilities is needed, but these problems are
too basic and important to be dealt with in a Section
of a Preliminary Survey.
I. EXPENDITURE
The Local Authorities spend each year very
considerable sums of money on Revenue Account.
In the Financial Year i959/6o
, 
about £53"3 million
was spent and!in I96o/6r about £55"5 million.
. ,Central Government expen&ture m the same years
on Current Account was £i28.7 million and
£I39.6 million respectively. There is, however, an
element of double counting if we directly compare
Local Authority expenditure with Central Govern-
ment expenditure in that part of the expenditure of
the latter is a grant to the Local Authorities and
thus goes to finance part of their expenditure.
These grants amounted to £22"9 million in x959/6o
and £23.1 million in I96o/6!. ’Thus Central
Government expenditure excluding grants to the
Local Authorities amounted to £io5.8 million in
1959/6o and £116.5 million in I96o/6I and these
are the figures which should .be used if it is desired
to compare Local Authority Revenue expenditure
figures with Central Government Revenue .expendi-
ture figures. Local Authority expenditures in
I959/6O and I96o/6I, therefore, amounted tO
about 5O~/o of net Central Governmen.t Revenue
expenditure.
To avoid confusion it may be useful to state that
Committees, Committees of Agriculture and
Harbour Authorities and, as stated earlier, the
Paper is Confined to Local Authorities narrowly
defined as those whose accounts are summarised in
Returns of Local Taxation:
In 195o/51 the ¯Local Authorities spent £29{o
million and the net expenditures of the Central
Government¯ amounted to about £72"4 million.
Thus Local Authority expenditures were about
40% of Central Government expenditure. [’in~
1938/39 Central Government net expendith~b~ ....
were about £28.4 million and at £12.o: million
these figures do not tally exactly with the figures of’, Local¯ Authority expenditures amounted to slightly
Central Government grants to Local Authorities less than 42% of this total. The pr0i~0rtion,
and Local Authority expenditure published in the
annual-Tables in connection with the Financial
Statement..:This is because the Tables include the
grants and the expenditure of various bodies whose
"accounts are, not summarised in the Returns of
"Local Taxaiion such as Vocational Education
therefore, is higher to-day than it was before the
war and has increased quite steeply during the
last ten years. At the present time¯ Local Authority
¯ .expenditure is running at about £21 per capita
and constituting some 8.5% of the Gross National
Product’.
TABLE I : REVENUE EXPENDITURE OF RATING AUTHORITIES, x959/6o
, 
£m.
County Councils...
County Borough
Councils ...
U~D. and Borough
Councils      ...
TOTAL ...
%
Public
Roads Assistance
xo.5 0.8
0.8 0.2
0.3
11.6 I’O
22% 2%
Mental
Health
i
3’3
8%
Health
lO.4
Sanitary
Services
i.5
2"I
O’7
, 4’3
8%
. ¯ ..
Housing
"7 ¯,
4"4
1[*4 ’
9"5
18%
’General
Purposes Total
3"9 34"2
:2"4
~ 14’8
1"8
-:4"3iv
"I
15%
~i)53.2
,I00
J:
- " NOTES ON. TABLE x .,:
x. Source : Returm of Local Taxation, i959/60. .            ’. ’-,:-, ..... ,7      :
, :     2." Included in the General Purposes heading is expenditure on items such as Fire Brigades, Tourist Development,
Public Libraries, Rate Collection and the pr0~,ision of Universi~7 and SecondaiT Scho91 Scholarships. : It also includes the
Grants which Local Authorities make to Vocational Education Committees and Committees of Agriculture.         ~
3. The County Borough Councils (which number four) are resp0nslble in their’areas for the provision ~ all Local
Authority services with the exception of Health and Public Assistance services which are administered by J o!nt (C0unty.and
County Borough) Health Atithorities. The County Councils (27 Authorities) are responsible in all theparts o t the c~unty whte.h
are not designated Urban Districts or Boroughs for all services In the urban areas the Urban District Councils and the Borough
Councils (56 Authorities in all, including the seven Borough Councils) take .responsibility for roads other than main roads, which
remain the responsibility, of the County Council, and for sanitary services., housing services, and re.oat ot the ltems.~vhlch tall
under general purposo expenditures. -The County Councils, however, remain responslh!e for the mal.n roads and also:for healt..h,
mental health and public assistance. It is because of this overlap as between the Urban District Councils and the County Counctls
that it is convenient and, indeed, necess .ary~in many comparisons of expenditure, rateab!e Value, and revenue to add together the
expenditures, etc., of the County Counctlsand the Urban Dlstrtct Councils of the parttcular county. Thts ts done m_a numt~er
¯ of the comparisons made later in the Paper. "
~
.L
¯ "9~
" ~.~
¯
’ "C.
[.- (
Table I indicates the expenditure pattern of the
three types of Rating Authority. These Authorities
"accounted for over 95% of the expenditure recorded
in Returns of Local TaxaHon.~ The Table also
indicates the relative importance of the three main
types of Authority. It is also clear that the Local
Authorities are responsible for many important
services notably in the fields of health, housing;
and the provision of roads. Table 2 indicates the
pattern and growth of the expenditures of the
Local Authorities as a whole, during the past
twelve years.
of the financial position of Local Authorities then
the expected growth in their expenditure will lead
to those features becoming more marked and
(’burdensome ; a review of the field at this stage is,
5- therefore, timely.
II. SOME GENERAL ARGUMENTS
AND ASSUMPTIONS
(a) Independence
Local Authorities are subsidiary and subordinate
bodies. They derive their powers, ability to act,
TABLE ~: PATTERN AND GROWTH OF LOCAL AUTHORITY REVENUE EXPENDITURE, 1948/9-196o/6,
Roads ......
Public Assistance ...
Mental Health ...
Health ......
Aggregate of Public
Assistance, Mental
Health and Health
Sanitary Services ...
Housing .......
General Purposes ...
TOTAL " ...
1948/9
4"7 I8
2"3 9
2"3 9
9’3 36
2"0 8
3.0 II
3"9 15
26.0 ioo
1951/2 I 1955/6
£m. °/o I £m. °/o
7.1 I 21 11.6 25
6’3 19 I "I 2,
3"o 9 3"7 8
4"I I2 12"5 27
I3"4 4° 17"3 37
2’5 8 3"4 7
4’3 .13 7"1 15
6"2 18 7"0 15
33"5 IOO 46’4 Ioo
1959/6°
11"6
£m. o I
22
I’I i 2
4"5 8
15"o 28’
20’6I 38
4’4 : 8.
9"6 18
7"0 I3
53"3 1oo
196o/61
£m. %
12"I 22
1"2 2
4.8 9
15’2 27
21.2 38
4"7 8
9"9 18
7"6 14
55"5 lOO
196o/61
aS~/oof
I948[9
155
26
209
661
228
235
33°
I95
213,
NOTES ON TABLE 2
I. Source : Returns of Local Taxation. i
2. In eonsiderlng the Health and Public Assistance figures for i948/49 and I951/52 on the one hand and the remaining
years on the other it should be noted that the Public Assistance figures for the two early years include certain expenditures on the
provision of medical care which in the later years are included under the Health heading. Since July, 196o, the Mental Health
Services have been administered as part of the general Health Services. Because of these two happenings aggregate figures for
the three services have been included and for many purposes it is best to concentrate attention on the aggregate rather than .the
individual figures.
, :
The expenditure of Local Authorities is large
and has been growing. It seems likely that expendi-
ture will continue to rise for "there is considerable
need and pressure for improvements in connection
with many of the services i~rovided. If--as is
believed there are certain unsatisfactory features
~Excluded is the expenditure of Town Commissioners
amounting to less than £,25,ooo and that of certain other
Local Authority bodies such as separate Public Assistance
Authorities and Joint Mental Health Boards, etc., but contribu-
tions to these bodies by the various Rating Authorities are
included. 1959/6o is the last year for which full statistics are
available. Since that financial year there has been a number of
changes in the system of organising the various services,
notably an amalgamation of the Health and Mental Health
Services.
functions and duties from decisions of the Central
Government and Acts of the Oireachtas. Local
Authorities cannot undertake~ services without
legislative authorisation and--Perhaps more im-
portantly-they can be compelled to ¯develop
whatever services the government and the Oir-
eachtas may call upon them to undertake without
the Central Government having to make any
special fimmcial provision. These two chiiracter-
istics follow, of course, from the fact that Ireland
is a unitary and not a federal Star6: There is no
residual sovereignty wh~itsoever in the Local
Authorities.
Even in a unitary State, however, there can be
differences in the effective independence of Local
Authorities or--looking at it from the other side--
in the degree of Central Government control and
influence. At one extreme a position can exist in
which Local Authorities are little more than
executive agencies of the Central Government,
possessing little discretion as regards the level and
broad pattern of their expenditure, little financial
independence, and hardly any freedom as regards
the appointment or terms of service of their officials.
On the other hand it is possible to have Local
Authorities with considerable autonomy and free-
dom of choice as regards the level and pattern of
their expenditure, with .independent sources of
revenue, and with the ability to choose staff and
fix salaries.
In considering financial matters the degree of
independence that Local Authorities have with
respect to the Central Government and the extent
to which it is desired that they should be fairly
independent is of considerable importance. This
is so for three main reasons.
In the first place if the Local Authorities of a
country are, in essence, merely agencies for the
execution of Central Government policy then it
should follow that the standard of service provided
by the various Authorities should be fairly similar
and that if some finance has to be provided from
local sources the burden of such local taxation
should be roughly equal ’from one Authority to
another. If, on the other hand, Local Authorities
are fairly independent bodies with considerable
freedom and there exists permissive legislation
enabling them to operate in many fields then there
is no particular reason why levels of service or
levels of taxation should be similar ; One Authority
may choose to have a high level of public consump-
tion and-a correspondingly high level of local
taxation; another may take the opposite view.
The second point concerns Central Government
financial support for Local Authorities. If the
Local Authorities are regarded as executive agencies
then clearly the Central Government must keep
the same control over their expenditure as over the
expenditure of government departments. :Money
will be made available to them only in connection,
with schemes which have been approved and
Central Government auditors and inspectors will
riced to see that the moneys have been sPent in
accordance with the approved requests. If, on the
other hand, Local Authorities are regarded as
responsible b0dies then the Central Government
should be more willing to make " block grants "
and leave it to the financial staff of the Local
Authorities and the watchfulness of elected council-
lors to ensure that there is no extravagance, unwise
. spending, or fraud.
The third point relates to the financial resources
at the disposal of Local Authorities. Regarded as
agencies of the Central Government Local Author-
ities do not ne~ed to have independent sources of
revenue. If, however, Local Authorities are to be
responsible bodies with, at any rate, some power to
do things which the Central Government is not too
keen they should do then it is desirable and probably
necessary that: they should have some financial
independence; should have~ taxes under their
control which would enable them to finance a good
deal of expenditure.
It is not easy to fit the Irish system of Local
Authorities into either of the two rather extreme
categories we have distinguished. There is much
to suggest that the Irish system is close to the
" agency" model. From an historical point of view
Local Authorities in Ireland are, on the whole,
fairly recent creations of the Central Government
and they were formed to do certain tasks. This
short history and rather subordinate role contrasts
with the position in England where many of the
Local Authorities have a long history and a con-
siderable tradition of independence With respect to
the Central GoTcernment. Then again the powers
of the Central Government are very considerable.
As well as having powers of inspection and audit
the Minister may dissolve Councils and remove
officials. Local Authorities also have limited
powers with respect to the appointment of key
members of staff and Cover their salaries and
conditions of employment--though they do have
to approve general increases in salaries, arising, for
example, out of a change in the cost of living. The
fact that Central Government financial help to
Local Authorities is in the form of grants tied
closely to specific services and items of expenditure
is also indicative of the desire and power of the
Central Government to control. Finally, and
perhaps most important, there is no doubt that in
certain very important spheres of activity the Central
Government has deliberately chosen the Local
Authorities to be the chosen instrument through
Which public aid will be directed. The construction
and maintenance of the main roads of the State is
in the hands of the Local Authorities ; the Central
Government has laid upon the Local Authorities
the definite responsibility of providing important
medical .services; in housing, too, the Local
Authorities are the CentraiGovernment’s chosen
instruments. To help the Local Authorities in
these tasks the Central Government does, of course,
make available to them considerable financial
assistance. This, in turn, is evidence of the view
it is desired to stress here, namely that in these
’important spheres--and expenditure on health,
main roads, and housing constitutes considerably
more than 50% of Local Authority Revenue
expenditures--the Local Authorities are engaged in
implementing the decision of the Central Govern-
ment that the Local Authorities should be the
instrument or machine through which government
action or help in these spheres will flow, and the more
basic decision that there should be public action
in these fields. And Ministers are likely to be taken
to task in the D~il for the action or inaction of
Local Authorities in implementing these decisions.
So far our arguments have suggested that Local
Authorities in Ireland have little independence
from the Central Government. There are a number
of points, however, which can be made in support
of the opposite view. First, and most important,
is the fact that Authorities do from time to time
refuse to do what the relevant Minister would like
them to do and do things which he would rather
they did not do. Many Councillors and County
Managers are very independently minded ! In this
connection it is important to note that with some
services the power of the Central Government is
much stronger than with respect to others. In the
case of health, for instance, the Minister has the
statutory power to ensure that the Local Authorities
do provide a certain minimum level of service ; in
the case of housing, on the other hand, the Minister
does not have such power and can only try to get
things done by persuasion. A second point is that--
as we shall see--Local Authorities do have their
own independent sources of revenue which at the
present time finance over 5o% of their expenditures.
In the light of these considerations it is hardly
possible to regard Irish Local Authorities purely as
agencies of the Central Government and the
existence of elected councils as a mere facade. On
the other hand there is no denying the power of the
Central Government and the fact that in certain
important spheres the Local Authorities are the
Central Government’s chosen instrument.
Faced with these considerations it is tempting
to meet the dilemma by arguing that Local Authority
expenditure is of two types. That part is expenditure
done at the command, request or instigation of the
Central Government and that with respect to this
" national" expenditure the various points we
made above concerning " agency" expenditure
should apply. And that the rest of expenditure is
" local " or " voluntary" and that with respect
to this the " independent" or " autonomy"
points should apply. This sort of distinction,
however, is not really very useful. For in a very
real sense most of the expenditure of Local Author-
ities is both " national " and " local ". " Local "
in that though--as in the case of main roads--
expenditures may benefit people outside the
particular area in which it is incurred, there is no
doubt that Local Authority expenditures as a
whole are mainly of benefit to the local populations.
On the other hand most of the expenditure is
also " national " in that it is a reflection of the
Central Government’s decision that Local Author-
ities are its chosen instrument for action in certain
fields.
What seems desirable in the Irish setting is to
try to avoid making sharp distinctions. Local
Authorities do have some independence but they
operate within a framework set by legislation, by
the decisions of the Central Government as to the
fields in which Local Authorities are to operate and
have a responsibility, by the grants which the
Central Government offers in support of particular
forms of expenditure, and by the various pressures
of Ministers. It is not profitable to discuss whether
a particular piece of expenditure or a particular
service is "national" or " local ". Almost always it
will be both. What is profitable is a discussion as to
the sort of services which should be operated by
Local Authorities and how they should be financed ;
and some considerations relevant to this are dis-
cussed in the next Section.
On the broad question of " independence " and
" autonomy " it has been suggested that at present
Local Authorities in Ireland have a certain freedom
of action and should certainly not be regarded
purely as agencies of the Central Government. It
seems likely that this state of affairs will continue.
For the rest of the Paper, at any rate, it will be
assumed that a fairly independent system of Local
Authorities is likely to continue and some of the
implications and requirements for the effective
and equitable working of such a system will be
explored.
(b) Expenditure and Revenue
An important general issue is the extent to which
Local Authorities should be responsible for provid-
ing services and for spending large sums of money ;
in particular the extent to which they should provide
services and spend money rather than" some other
public body, such as a Department of the Central
Government or a Public Board.
Perhaps the main criterion to have in mind in
considering this question is the extent to which it
is administratively cheaper and more efficient to
have a service supplied b)r a Local Authority rather
than having it supplied directly by the Central
Government or by some Other public body. If it
is cheaper this will constitute a prima facie ease in
favour of the Local Authority. Local Authority
control may often be cheaper as advantage can be
taken of an existing structure and the addition of
a new responsibility may, by enabling overhead
expenses to be spread over a larger total expenditure,
permit a new service to be provided at a lower cost
than would be required if a completely new organisa-
tion had to be created. On the other hand there
may sometimes be certain economies in providing
a service centrally. What is important in connection
with this criterion is that estimates Should be made
from time to time of the cost of alternative ways of
providing various services, and the result of such
calculations should be given weight in determining
which services should be operated by Local
Authorities and which by other bodies.
A number of services seem to merit examination.
Within the Local Authority framework the Health
Services are an obvious case. From a cost point of
view it seems quite possible that economies--in the
sense of getting as good a service with less money
or a better service with the same money---might
follow the creation of a national or regional organisa-
tion. Outside the present Local Authority field it
would seem that a number of services at present
provided in other ways might be provided more
cheaply if operated by the Local Authorities. Two
examples may indicate what is in mind. At the
present time the Electricity Supply Board: is
concerned with two rather separate businesses : the
production and generation of electricity on ’the one
hand and the selling of electricity to the consumer
on the other. Now in a number of countries these
two operations are kept fairly distinct. In the ease
of England, for example, there is a Central Board
responsible for generation and a series of separate
Boards responsible for sales. A possibility for
Ireland might be a central Board for the generation
of electricity and the Local Authorities having the
responsibility for selling to the consumer. This
might permit various economies asregards the
provision of office accommodation, office machines,
and clerical staff for there may well be a certain
duplication at the moment ; the E.S.B. for example,
operating over a hundred " sales and service"
establishments across the State. The second
example relates to the Employment Exchanges and
other offices operated by the Department of Social
Welfare throughout the country. Again, it seems
possible that economies might be secured by having
6
the Local Authorities acting as agents of the Central
Government and taking over the work done by
these offices.
It is perhapsworth emphasising that in no sense
is it being suggested that the Health Services
should be taken from the Local Authorities or that
the selling of electricity and the operation of the
Social Welfare schemes should be taken Over by the
Local Authorities. All that is being suggested is
that there is need to be continuously~asking the
question whether the existing distribution of
services as between the Central Government and
the Local Authorities is the right one and in the
light of the criterion we have been considering so
far--namely .economy--this involves cost com-
parisons that are difficult but nevertheless worth
"making or attempting.
/ The second criterion relates to those services in
which there is considerable scope for local variety
and initiative such as in the field of housing and in
the provision of library services, public parks,
swimming pools and amenity services generally. If
public funds are to be devoted tO these fields there
is a great deal to be said for Local Authorities being
the body which disposes of them. Similarly, those
services which are extremely important from a local
point of view and which need to be tailored to suit
particular local requirements such as the provision
of fire brigades, water, waste disposal services,
street lighting, etc., are suitable services to be ~n
by Local Authoriti&. Broadly speaking then it is
suggested in this context that services which touch
the citizen fairly directly, and in connection with
which it is important that he should not feel they
are operated by some remote Authority outside his
influence and control, should be operated byLocal
Authorities.
One of the great advantages of the LOcal
Authority system is that the~ ordinary citizen" can
contact fairly easily his counciUor and makei! his
views known, and on the whole elected cotlneils
are made aware of what the local population Want
and--though with certain lags--are responsive to
thisknowledge of what the public wants and what
it won’t stand.
¯ Thirdly, and linked with the preceding argument,
there are the rather tenuous arguments in favour of
Local Authority control which emphasise that Local
Authority work provides an opportunity for the
practice of democratic government both for council-
lors and the Ordinary citizen in his capacity as
voter and critic. Belief in the value of having
effective democratic control of government activity.
will, on thewhole, tend to make one favour having
Local Authorities operating services which ¯have
a definite impact on citizens in the areas in which
they live rather than having them :operated by
public corporations, or by branches of a Central
Government Department, the operations of which
it is difficult to influence through local action.
One additional point needs to be stressed. If
Local Authorities are to do their work efficiently
they probably need to be operating on a fairly large
scale. Not only are there likely to be administrative
economies arising from size but officials of ability
will not. be willing to serve nor will Sufficient
numbers of able councillors be willing to offer
themselves for election unless an Authority is of
a certain minimum size, in the sense of its level of
expenditure. On the assumption tha~ the number
of Local Authorities remains as it is at present this
implies for Ireland that the Local Authorities must
be responsible for a good number of services.
Given .that it is desired to have Local Authorities
¯ operating some~services then they probably have to
operate a good number 1
¯ Clearly a good deal of research is needed before
one could demonstrate whether in the light of the
above criteria Local Authorities are operating too
many or too few services and, if the balance is not
the appropriate one, which¯ services should be
taken over or released. Such research needs to be
done but it has not yet been done. For the present
Paper, therefore, it is proposed to proceed on the
basis .of an assumption--which, however, represents
the writer’s present conviction’--namely that Local
Authorities are not operating too many services or
spending too much money in relation to other
government agencies, though there may well be
some services at present performed by Local
Authorities which might be better done in other
ways and vice versa.
So far we have not mentioned income or revenue.
This has been quite deliberate. It is considered that
the various criteria that we have been discussing
are the important factors in considering the size and
scope of Local Authority spending. But, ofcourse,
these decisions having been made revenue has to
be found I
There are many ways in which Local Authorities
may be financed. At one extreme they could receive
all their revenue in the form of grants from the
Central Government. At the other they could be
capacity. For the coumry as a whole this means
that the total amount of revenue required--for both
local and Central Government purposes--can, be
raised without paying any particular attention to the
locality in which the various taxpayers reside. If
in a State the broad principle is accepted of levying
taxation in accordance with the ability to pay or
taxable capacity of the tax payers the financing of
Local Authorities from State funds enables this
principle to be applied right across the State. Ir~
these circumstances a person with the same taxable ~
capacity will tend to pay the same amount in ’
taxation no matter where he lives. Such a system
also enables Local Authority expenditure to be
much more a reflection of the needs of the various.
areas than of their relative wealth.
There is thus a great deal to be said for this type , ¯
of financial arrangement: Two types of objection,.
however, can be made. First, there is the argument
that it makes for inefficiency in administration in
that the Local Authorities are involved in spending
money which they have no responsibility for"
collecting. It is argued that the unwillingness to
increase local taxes--because of the political
unpopularity of such action--provides an important
incentive to economffin administration and that if
this pressure is removed--as it would be if all
revenue was provided by the State--there would be
a tendency for standards of efficiency to decline and
wasteful or extravagant expenditure to become
common. It is difficult to accept this view. If it
were true it would imply that many individual
departments of the Central Government and many
departments of large business organisations are
inefficient, for these bodies are not responsible for
raising their own revenue. In fact accounting and
budgetary procedures have been devised and are in
operation in most large scale organisations to ensure
that waste, extravagance, and inefficiency do not
occur ; and if they do occur it is the operation of
these systems and the people manning them that is
at fault and not the absence of some fairly close and
direct link between the raising and spending of
funds. And in the case of Local Authorities it
would be possible for the Central Government to
make continuing studies of the relative costs of
providing the various services in the different
Local Authorities ; and in this way both check the
expected to finance all their expenditures from their ,performance of the Local Authorities and provide
own resources. In between, there could be variou~ them with some guidance as to the appropriate level
combinations of Central Government help and
self-finance.
The great advantage of the first method is that it
breaks the connection between the level of services
that are provided in an area and its wealth or taxable
of costs fo~ particular services.
The second broad objection relates to the problem
of the allocation of funds between the various Local
Authorities. This could take place in a number of
different ways.
~.,
¯
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One approach would be for the Central Govern-
ment, having determined in broad terms the total
amount of money available forthe Local Authorities,
to allocate this total on---say--a population basis
between the various Authorities/.. thusmaking
available to each ofthem a large" block grant"
and leaving them with freedom to spend it as’ they
wished within the framework of~the existing
legislation and the instructions anddeclared wishes_
of the Central Government. Such a method would
give Local. Authorities a great opportunity for the
exercise of local initiative and enterprise. There
are’, however, two main disadvantages of such an
arrangement. .
First, is the fact that needs may vary greatly from
area to area and that a population basis might be an
unfair way of allocating the available funds: One
authority might have many miles of roads to
maintain ; another relatively’few : one might have
many houses in a decrepit condition whereas another
might have few ; one area might be poorand, its
people unable tO afford to pay for medical attefiti0n’
and thus require public support on. this count,
whereas another might have relatively few citizens
requiring such help. Many of these objections
c0uld, ’of course, be met by making the formula for
the :allocation of .funds a much more complicated
one t0 take account of the various needs of the
different areas and, so long as good statistical
information was available with respect to the positi0r~
in different parts of the country, this could probably
be done ....
The second objection to the "block grant "
approach is that itgreatly reduces the abHity., of the
Central Government t0 ~influence,. persuade, or
control Local Authorities andI a Central Govern-
ment may well be unwilling to give up its powers
in this way if the Local Authorities, as its agents,
are charged with the duty of performing important
services affecting the general public.
An alternative way of organising a hiandred per
cent. State support system is for the .state to
invite Local Authorities to put in fairly detailed
requests for money for.-particular, services or
projects and if the application is granted .for the
Local Authority to be kept in its spending pretty
closely to the details of the approved application.¯
This keeps a considerable amount Of power in the
hands of the Central Government and, of Course,
correspondingly .reduces the effective freedom of
the Local Authorities. A major difficulty of this
arrangement
, 
however, concerns the criteria the
Central Government is going to use in determining
the allocation of funds. There is likely to be a
8
tendency for fundsto flow to the Authority that
puts up the best prepared schemes rather than to
those where the need is greatest, though it should be
possible to avoid some of the worst dangers of this.
The real problem is that. Local Authorities will
have every incentive in such a siiuati0n to. put up
a very large number of schemes since,~ on’:t~.e one
hand,no costs fall upon the Authority, or, dii~eetly,
upon the local people and--on the other hand the
local people, will benefit from and the Local
Authority Obtain credit for a high level :of local
services. With-this sort of.arrangemen~ the Central
Government :"dan never be sure" just- how, much
importance"’ the "Local Authority attaches to a.
particular scheme.                 ~ -
Various devices to help the Central Government
make a rational choice such as requesting Local,~
Authorities to put up their: projects in order of’
priority can be used, but l they are by no .means
completely foolproof. A great advantage of a
system in which local resources have to, bear at
least Some partof the cost of a project is that in
such cases when l the Local Authority makes an
application for State :assistance the State does know
that the Local Authority attaches importance to the
project, for inmaking an: application it has .indicated
its willingness to back its request with hard cash.
Clearly it would be possible to have a e6mpromise
hundred per cent. grant system in which part of
the State help to Local’ Authorities is in the form
Of ai" block grant-", given on the basis 6f either
¯
. ¯    ,,
a "simple" or " Compheated ~formula, and part
given on the basis 6f !application with respect to
specificprojects. To help meet the’point:we have
just discussed it Would be !possible to: insist that
inmaking application for~ ’~,.specific" grant the
Local:Authority must ,agree ~o bear part of the
cost of the project out:6fifs ,~!;.block ;grant"...~ By
the Use ofthisand ¯other me~h6ds of administrative
control it -would pr0bably!be. possibi6": to make
a hundred .per cent:’, grant~ System .,~0rk fairly
effectively and for a considerableamoui~ of Local
Authority independence and freedom t~:be main-
tained--if One condition was satisfied. Such a system
couldonly ¯operate if the Central G0xTernment,
believing in the’ importance of the autonomy of
Local Authorities, was prepared to operate’a Self-.
denying ordinance with respect to the~amount of
control it exercised. It is doubtful if many:Central
Governments would really be prepared ¢o~exercise
Such self-restraint when providing all the funds~
though the U.K. system of university finance
almost provides ahiexample. For’ thi~’:reason it
seems doubtful if the full hundred per eeni. system
is a really practicable proposition in~-a country
’-...
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which wishes Local Authorities to have a good
deal of independence.
We must now consider the case for hundred per
cent. self-financing. The main argument in favour
of such a method is that Local Authorities are
completely independent of the Central Government
from a financial point of view. This has obvious
attractions for believers in the importance of having
an autonomous system of Local Authorities but
the disadvantages of such an arrangement seem
overwhelming. In the first place Central Govern-
ment influence and control is reduced to a minimum,
and this is inappropriate in a unitary State unless
the Local Authorities are only expected to spend
fairly small sums of money and be responsible for
a few services.
It is, in fact, probable that if Local Authorities
had to finance their activities from their own
resources they would only be able to operate on
a fairly low level. The reason for this is that the
taxation resources which it is practicable and
desirable to leave in the hands of Local Authorities
are not likely to be sufficient to raise substantial
sums of money. In Ireland, for example, Local
Authorities have but one form of taxation at their
disposal--the local rate. Irl’ a later Section of the
Paper we will be looking at this tax in some detail
but at the moment the point it is desired to stress
is that there would be strong arguments against
increasing by any very considerable amount the
yield of this tax, and yet at the moment it only
finances about 4O~/o of local expenditures. It
would seem that if Local Authorities in Ireland
had to depend upon their own resources their
level of expenditure would have to be reduced,
and in the light of:our earlier discussions this
Would be undesirable.
An important question here is to what extent
there:are other possible local taxes. There is scope
for a good deal of research into this question but
a first examination of the problem suggests that
prospects are not really goofl. On the whole
almost all the existing Central Government taxes
that bring in large sums of- money are much better
organised centrally--in the sense of keeping the
cost of the collection low. It is possible that Local
Authgrities might be able to raise soirie revenue
by ihaposing a licence duty on bicycles, or a tax on
’ entertainments, or on expenditure in hotels, but
it is not thought that the amount of revenue likely
to be collected in these ways would be large.~
sit is interesting to note that a very powerful committee set
up by the Royal Institute of Public Administration to consider
new sources Of local revenue for the U.K: came to the con-
ehmior~ "-havi~g_rev~ewed the whole field of other potential
local taxes " that only three could be recommended for the
The third argument against hundred per cent.
self-financing is that there may be substantial
differences in wealth between the variot~s Authorities.
In such circumstances an effect of this method of
finance will be for there either to be a lower level of
serqice in the poorer areas with the same level of
taxation, or the same level of services with a higher
level of taxation---or a combination of these two
extremes, namely the existence in the poorer areas
of both a somewhat lower level of services and a
higher level of taxation than in the better off areas.
Now if the differences in wealth between the
various Authorities are not great and if the Central
Government is not expecting Local Authorities to
carry out many important services then such
differences would not matter very much. But in the
case of Ireland the Local Authorities are, as we
have seen, expected to carry out important duties
and--as will be suggested belowwit is believed there
are important differences of wealth as between the
various Rating Authorities.
We have reachedlby elimination as it were~
the conclusion that it is probably useful that tile
Local Authorities should be financed both, from
resources under their own control and by ~h’e State
Grants. In the next Section we consider the way~:
in which State support might be given and indle~ate
in broad terms some of the factors that are important
in considering how the revenue burden might be
allocated. In this discussion it will be assumed:
first, that there are differences in wealth between
the various parts of the State ; second, that Local
Authorities are expected to provide important
services likely to cost subs tantial;~ums of money ;
and third, that the taxable capacity of even the
better off Local Authorities is;:ihadequate in the
light of the work they are expe6ted to do.
I
(e) Grants
it is useful to distingqish three main types of
grant which a Central Ggvernment might make to a
Local Authority or, to Put it in different terms, three
U.K:’:"’~-a local income tax, a local entertainment tax, and
driving liccnces. See New Sources of Local Revenue, Allen
and Unwin,~London~ I955. All these recommendations and
suggestions .,~¢ere rejected pretty emphatically by the U.K.
governm..,enf (see the U.K. White Paper, Local Government
Finance, Cmnd., 2o9, I957). In Irish, ~onditions it is doubtful
if a local income tax would be very suitable because of the
existence of large numbers of farmers who do not pay State
Income’ Tax on their actual incomes but only on a notional
income. Consequently no estimates of actual taxable income
arisingip an area could b* made available to a Local Authority
by the"iq.evenue Commissioners and thus it would not he
possible for a Local Authority to operate a proper local Income
Tax, system unless an expensive .new assessing machinery
was established. This would almost certainly be quite im-
practicable.
main ways in which Central Government. financial
support might be given to Local Authorities.
First, there are what We may-call percentage
grants. These are grants made either with respect to
expenditure on a particular service or with respect
to expenditure as a whole, the amount of the grant
depending on how much a Local Authority proposes
to spend from its own resources. A Central Govern-
ment may, for example, agree to pay 5O~/o---or some
other percentage----of the total expenditure on a
particular project. Or again, it could agree to pay a
given percentage of expenditure above a certain
figure. Grants of this type are particularly useful to
a Central Government wishing to "persuade" or
control " Loe’al Authorities. They " persuade ’
because these grants, particularly if the percentage
is fairly high, encourage Local Authorities to
embark on expenditur,e in~ the fields in which grants
are given, for each-pound from a Local Authority’s
own resources attracts further financial support.
This type of grant also assists the Central Govern-
ment to "control " because the grant is usually
given only in connection with:" approved expendi-
ture ", and it is the Central Government which
lays down what will and what will not be approved.
A disadvantage of this sort of grant is that it does
not particularly help the relatively poor Authorities ;
indeed their general tendency is in the opposite
direction. Those Authorities that can afford to spend
most receive most by way of grant.
A second form of grant is an " equalisation" or
" redistributive " grant. The object of such a
grant is to make more¯ even the resources available
to the Local Authorities by giving financial help to
those Authorities’which, because they cover rela-
tively poor areas, are less well off than others. ,The
advantage of such support to thei Ai~thorities who
receive it is obvious. An advantage to the Central
Government is, knowing that the resources of the
weaker Local Authorities have been strengthened,
it may feel freer to ask Local Authorities to operate
certain services which in its opinion are better
operated by Local Authorities but in the ¯absence
of such a grant would not have been suitable for
Local Authority operation because of the too heavy
burden they would have imposed on the poorer
Authorities. An obvious difficulty in the administra-
tion of such grants is the need for reliable and
accurate statistical information concerning the rela-
tive income or wealth or taxable capacity of the
various areas in order that there should be a
satisfactory basis for the allocation of the grant.
The third type of grant we may call a " general"
or ,neutral" grant. It may be thought of as designed
to meet the problem of the general lack of taxable
IO
capacity at the disposal of the Local Authorities--
even the richest ones--in~ the light of the 91~!igati0ns
laid on them by the State. Such a grant ig;y~ade
available to Local Authorities on the basis of some
fairly Objective criterion such as population
, 
though
more complicated formulae can be devised to take
account of the relative needs of an area. It should
be noted, howe.ver, that in our terminology the,
incorporation into the grant formula of any attempt
to take account of the-different needs Of the various,
Authorities has the effect of making the grant a
"redistributive " rather than a ," neutral " one.4
¯ It is considered that there is a:place in Ireland for
all three types of grant : percentage grants s0 that
the Central Government has the abilityt0 persuade
and control in those spheres where it holds very
strong views and is certain of the action .it wishes
Local Authorities to take ; redistributive grants so
as to build up the resources of the poorer Authorities ~,~"~"
in order that the citizens of such Authorities should
not receive a lower level of service or suffei~.:a higher.
burden of local taxation than. those living :in more
fortunate parts of the State; and neutral grants
because, it is believed the financial resources of eyen
thee richer Authorities are too low given the range of ’
, t
services .they are expec.ted to provide-and the
taxation resources at their disposal.
The case for " neutral" grants probably needs a
little more explanation. The case. rests essentially
upon the relation between the expenditure necessary
to carry out the obligations of Local Authorities and
servlces,whtch the CentraiGovern- ~ ’~particularly th     " ’ " ¯
ment.expects them to perform and the:: revenues
which it is appropriate they should raise themselves.
Given that the Local Authorities in Ire/and have
only one tax at their disposal " and that as:we shall
see in the next part of the Paper one which:has many
imperfections~it is probable that at:the present
time even the better off Authorities’should probably
not be raising in Local Taxation much:more than
the 4o% of’their present level of e xpenditurewhich
is what they raise at the moment, and thiS level of
expenditure is judged not to be too high.i~ The gap
has to be filled by government grants. The particular
case for neutral grants arises out of the need to    :
ilndeed, in the last analysis grants really fall into. two main
categories ; specific grants, i.e., those related to:a particular
service or activity and non-specific or block grants which are
not so linked. However, it is felt that for our present purposes
the threefold distinction is a useful classification. It should,
perhaps, be reeognised that from certain points of view the
concept of a " neutral " grant may be slightly misleading,
in that if two Authorities, one rich and one poor, receive
equal per capita grants then the effective value of the grant may
be greater to the poorer area than to the richer. Similarly an
equal per capita grant to an#r~a with a large population may
be of greater real benefit~an the same per capita grant to an
area with a small population.~ Considerations ’of this ’sort are
ignored in our conception of a " neutral " grant.~- i
¯ .. ¯ ,’:( :
maintain a reasonably independent system of Local
Authorities. Percentage grants though they may
not’~foi:mally limit their freedom--grants can be
rejected~do have a considerable persuasive in-
fluence and if it is desired to have Local Authorities
making up their ow1~ minds as to how expenditure
should be allocated then ther~ is a case for having
the percentage .rate rather low, which in the Irish
case implies the need for additional’ " neutral"
grants.
The conclusion here is not very precise. It
has been suggested that there is a case for the
expenditure of Local Authorities being financed
in part from local taxation and also that there is a
need for percentage grants, redistributive grants,
and neutral grants. We have argued against both a
hundred per cent. grant system and hundred per
cent. self-financing. It is difficult to go much
beyond these rather general and qualitative state-
ments with respect to local finance generally for so
much depends upon a detailed consideration of the
expenditure and the revenue position of the Local
.. Authorities with which one is concerned. As
regards Irish Local Authorities it will be better
to postpone further discussion till, in the next
parts of the Paper, we have looked in some little
detail at their revenue and expenditure pattern.
(d) An Alternative View
Earlier in this part of the Paper and also in the
next two main parts a particular attitude is taken
with respect to the broad principles that should
govern the raising and spending of government
funds. On the whole it is taken for granted that
government revenue should be collected in accord-
ance with the ability to pay or taxable capacity
of the citizens--though it is appreciated that this
broad objective is open to a variety of interpretations.
On the expenditure side it is accepted that in so far
as there are benefits which are available to individuals
the guiding principle should be either their general
availability to all citizens or their availability on
some assessment o.f need. These two principles or
assumptions--of taxation being levied in accordance
with ability to pay and services being available in
accordance with needs--underlie the whole Paper.
Now in accepting this approach an alternative
view has been implicitly rejected, namely the view
that the benefits of government expenditure should
be enjoyed in proportion to the amount a person
contributes to the State and, similarly, that taxes
should be paid in relation to the benefits derived
from State activity. This " alternative view"
would hardly be maintained anywhere to-day in
relation to the expenditure and taxation position
of Central Governments but it is sometimes argued
that it should be the relevant approach to Local
Authorities. The supporters of the view maintain
that the activities of Local Authorities are much
more like the activities of a business than the
.activities of a government ; and that in connection
,with the provision of such services as sewerage,
water supply, garbage collection, street lighting,
fire brigades, etc., it is reasonable that people should
contribute to Local Authorities not in proportion
to their ability to pay but in proportion to the extent
to .which they make use of such facilities. It is
~appreciated that it is not easy to charge directly for
such services and that it will normally be necessary
to charge indirectly and determine an individual’s
taxation responsibility with respect to some fairly
rough and ready indicator of " use of services"
such as tl~e size or valu~ of properties occupied~
on the assumption that the larger the property
occupied by a person the greater the use made of the
various local services. This indirect approach
somewhat blurs the issue: nevertheless there is a
fundamental difference between the " cost and
benefit" and the " need and ability to pay "
approach.
It is believed that the " alternative view "
though not necessarily inappropriate with respect
to the activities of Local Authorities in many
countries cannot be accepted as particularly relevant
in Irish conditions. The approach might be useful
if Local Authorities were more or less completely
independent of the Central Government and were
engaged solely in operating.services of the business
type mentioned above. But if, as in Ireland, Local
Authorities are in part operating services on behalf
of the Central Government and providing such
services as main roads and medical services, a
cost/benefit approach is hardly appropriate.
There may, of course, be scope for charging in
whole or in part for some services, At the present
time the Local Authorifies for instance raise over
£io million by way of Fees, Charges, Licences,
Rents, etc., and it is possible that more should be
raised in this way. What is objected to is not the
levying of charges for certain Local Authority
services but the general acceptance of a complete
" cost and benefit" approach.
III. REVENUE
(a) General
The revenue of Irish Local Authorities is derived
¯ from three sources : rates, grants from the Central
Government and miscellaneous receipts such as
rents received for houses, water rents,-and contri-
II
butions by patients towards the cost of institutional revenue in recent years and Table 4 shows the
services in hospitals. Table 3 below sets out the trends with respect to Rates in the three main types
relative contributions of these three sources of of Authority during the past ten years.
T~LE ~3 :,,INCOME- ON REVENUE ACCOUNT OF LO’CAL?AUTHORITIES, I938/9-196o/6r
Rates* ......
State Grants ...
OtherR~eiists
TOTAL ...
1938/9
i"
’(gin. 1%
i
/ 6"3 I 5°‘
4"71 37 l
I’7 I I3
12.6 Iloo
1950/~I
£m.     %
~I 1.64°
12"9 45
4"I 14
28.7 , ioo
1959/6o
m° ’
2I’4
22"9
9"5
53"8
i96o[6I
%    £m. %
4° [ 22"3 40
43 [ 23"1 41
I8 ] IO"7 19
, I00 5’6"1 IO0
196o/61
as % of
I9381~.
354 .
49I
629
44s
i~959/6o
asi%of
,195o/i 195o/51
192 1184
179 177
26I :231
i95 ’ 187
Rates as % of
Grants ...
Rates~as,%, of
G.N.P ....
I34 9°
3"4 2’9
93
~3"4
96
3’4
, ?    ¯ , .
. [ . . . ¯ , .
Grants as% of
G.N.P.     .-.      2"5 .        3"2          3’7        3"6
Source : Returns of Local Taxation and the Statistical Abstract.
* Includes increases in rents of small dwellings owned by rating authorities which are in effect the rates paid by tenants
of Local Authority houses.
TABLE 4: ,RATES COLLECTED BY VARIOUS AUTHORITIES, 195o/t AND ’,1959/6o "
County Councils :,
195o/1 ...........
1959/66 .........
1959/6o as % of-195o/1 ...
County Borough Councils : i
¯ \
" I950/I ......... ,
1959/6o ..... .    ...
1959/6o as % of 195o/1 ...
Urban Dt3tr~t and Borough
¯ Coundls:
i95o/I .........
¯ 1959[6o ...... :..
I959/6oas%of195o/I...
All Three Authorities¯ :
¯ 195o/.1 ... . ....
1959/6o ....,....
# 1959/6o as % of 195o/1
A
Rates
Collected
£m. ¯
6"1
11.7
192%
B
Agricultural
Grant*
£m.
"3"9
5"5
141%
C
A+B
£m.
¯ I0"I
!7"2
¯ x7o%
3.6
6"2
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1"3
2"0
I6I ~/o
II "0
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.I8I%
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I4I%
3.6
6’2
172% ......
I’~3    .
2"0
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15"0
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¯ , ¯ D
¯Total
Expenditure
£m.
I9"3
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’i77%
~ 7"¢"
.... 14~8
_ ~oo%
2’3
4’3
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’29-o
~ 53"3
)!84%
i
fl
i i
i i
~... ¯
:
i
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. . ~ ¯ ,
Source : Returns of Local Taxation.
¯ *~Urban Districts and County Boroughs received negligible sums by way of the Agricultural Grant : these have been
ignored.                                                                                   , .
At this level of aggregation the following broad
trends can be distinguished. First, that during
the period 1938/39 to i95o/51 grants frorn the
Central Government increased considerably in
importance relatively to Rates. Since that time
Rates have maintained their position having in-
creased at roughly the same rate as Total Expendi-
ture and Total Revenue; during the period
195o/51--1959/6o Total Expenditure of Rating
Authorities went up by i84%
, 
Income by 187%
and Total Rates collected by I81~o. Since 195o/5i
Grants have declined in importance relatively to
miscellaneous receipts and have not kept up with
increases in expenditure.
The second trend and this is reflected in Table 4
--is that though the level of County Council
expenditure went up by a lower percentage than
the expenditures of County Boroughs or Urban
District Councils the rate burden went up by a
significantly higher percentage. Such a change is,
of course, the product of a number of forces but
a key element has been the relatively small per-
centage increase in the Agricultural Grant. Com-
paring 195o/51 with i959/6o the Agricultural
Grant declined from being 64% of the rates
collected to being 47°/0 and from 20°/0 of the
County Council level of expenditure to 16%. If
the Agricultural Grant had remained at the level
of 20% of expenditure it would have amounted
to £6.8 million in i959/6o and if the same combined
total of Rates and Agricultural Grant had been
required only some £1o.4 million would have been
needed in Rates, which would have reduced to
171% (from 192%) the ratio of rates collected in
1959/6o to rates collected in 195o/51. This would
have been roughly equivalent to the County Borough
and Urban District Council ratios.
In the next sections of the Paper the two main
elements on the income side--Rates and Grants--
are considered in a little detail. It is appreciated
that other receipts bring in nearly 20% of the
total revenue, that this sousce of finance has been
growing rapidly during the last twenty years, and
that there is probably scope for raising even more
revenue under this heading by adjusting various
fees, charges, costs, rents and--possibly--by under-
taking more " trading activities ". Even a first
examination of this very complicated field, however,
must be deferred to a later stage.
(b) Rates : Valuations
Rates are a tax levied on certain kinds of fixed
property (including certain rights, e.g., fisheries)
which have been declared by law to be taxable in
this way. The rateable value of fixed property
which is the basis on which the tax is levied is in
theory equal to the yearly rent which would be
acceptable to both landlord and tenant on the
assumption that the former pays for insurance and
external repairs to the property and the latter pays
the rates.
The exact liability depends, of course, not only
on the rateable value but also on the rate in the
pound charged by the Local Authorities. If, for
example, the rateable value in a particular area is
one million pounds and an expenditure of one
and a half million pounds has to be financed from
Rates then a rate poundage of thirty shillings is
required. It follows that a man occupying property
valued at £20 would have to pay £3° in rates.
The valuation of rateable property is carried
out by the Commissioner of Valuation and his
Department who are Central Government officials
acting under the general control of the Minister
for Finance. This has the great advantage in theory
of ensuring that valuations throughout the State
are carried out on a similar and consistent basis.
The basic law covering valuation is the Valuation
(Ireland) Act of i852.5 In essence the Act laid
down that all immovable property was to be Valued
for the purposes of rating, i.e., buildings, land,
mines, fisheries, canals, railways, etc., and that the
basis of valuation was to be the net annual value.
As regards land the net annual value was to be
ascertained by reference to a fixed scale of prices
which were laid down in the Act for the various
agricultural products and was to take into account
the quality of the land, proximity to market, etc.6
A general valuation under the 1852 Act was
completed in 1865. The valuation of lands has not
been altered sincethat time except to reallocate
them where holdings have been divided or amal-
gamated and except in the cities of Dublin and
Waterford where revaluations took place in 1916
and 1926 respectively. During the last hundred
years some of the land has deteriorated by neglect
or flooding whereas other parts have by good
husbandry, drainage and care been much improved.
New crops have been introduced and new sets of
5For an excellent discussion of the history and problems of
valuation in Ireland see : C. C. MeElligott, " The Problem
of Revaluation ", ffournal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry
Societ3, of Ireland, 1954/55. See also, H. Lisney, " Rating and
Valuation ", ffournal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry
Society of Ireland, 1938/39.
6The prices taken were in general the average of the prices
in forty Irish Market Towns during the period :.849/185i.
This was a period of considerable agricultural depression.
The chosen prices were (per ewt.) : Wheat, 7/6 ; Oats, 4/ro ;
Barley, 5/6 ; Flax, 49/- ; Butter, 65/4 ; Beef, 35/6 ; Mutton,
41/- ; and Pork, 3z/-.
:3
prices have led to changes in the composition of
¯ output. The building of railways and roads and
the arrival of motor ears, tractors and farm
machinery as well as the changes in-recent years
in methods of husbandry, use of fertilisers etc.,
have had great effects on farming throughout the
State.
Almost from the time the First Valuation was
completed there was concern about its adequacy.
It soon became clear that though valuations within
counties probably reflected fairly well the relative
productivity of the various parts’ there were
discrepancieswhen it came to making comparisons
between Counties. One important reason for this t
was that though the valuation began in I852 it wasI
not completed until I865. It commenced in the
South in the earlier year, when conditions as
regards property were at a pretty low ebb, and
finished in 1865 inthe North when conditions had
improved. Hence there was inequality in the
valuations as between the North and the South,
valuations in the North being relatively higher
than those in the SOuth. As early as I869 the
Commissioner of Valuation was of the opinion
that a number of the Counties needed their
valuations increased by, between 2[6 and 5/- an
acre in order to bring them in line with the valua-
tions of such Northern Counties as Cavan, Donegal
and Monaghan. These proposed increases were
substantial as the average valuation per acre in the
country as a whole was about 8/-.
In x9o2 the Royal Commission on Local Govern-
ment Taxation recommended that there should be
a general revaluation. In i93I the Committee0f
Enquiry into Derating was of the opinion that ~the
valuations. (absolute and relative) of Agricultural
Land were not in accordance with contemporary
relative values. All the recommendations’ and
criticisms have been of no avail, however, and land
valuations to-day roughly remain as they were
a hundred years ago.
The position as regards buildings is more
complicated. The cities of Dublin and Waterford
were revalued in x916 and I926. The valuations of
the Urban Districts of Galway and Buncrana
were revised between 1947 and ~95o. With these
exceptions there has been no general revision of the
7The valuing was done with very great care. The method
was later described as follows (Report of Royal Commission on
Local Taxation, 19o2): "For the-purpose of the valuation
the whole of Ireland was divided into districts, each district
was then divided into ’quality lots’, i.e., areas in which the
land was of equal value throughout, and the valufition of .the
separate holdings in each of these areas, the particulars of the
soil and sub soil, underlying rock and dim_ate as affected by
altitude, etc., were takeninto account. Regard was also paid
to facilities for getting Seaweed and bog for manure and fuel
and proximity to market towns ";
Valuations of buildings. This, of course, does not
mean that there have been no changes in the total
value of hereditaments since 1865. Each year new
buildings are completed :and occupied and are
valued for rating purposes. Each :year, too,
additions and modifications and extensions are
made to existing buildings and when this happens
the valuation is often (though not always) revised.,
The procedure as regards such revisions is as
follows. Under the law rate coilectors are required
each year to make out a list of all rate/ible properties
in their districts which require revision. Such
lists are sent to the Commissioner of, Valuation
through the relevant Local Authority~who have the
right to give their opinion ’as to whether the
revisions are necessary--though an omission to do
this or a recommendation that it is :not needed
does not affect the right of the Commissioner to
revise. In addition, any ratepayer in the district
maymake out a similar list, and the properties
need not .be his own.           ".. ’ ~- , "
In practice, however, the system works im-
perfectly and many properties have.-not iiad their
valuations revised since x865, including many
properties which have been improved. ’, And many
properties built "after 1865 ’have only had their
single, original.Valuation.
The I852 Act laid down that the basis of valuation
would be the net rent at which the landlord could
reasonably beexpected to let a property at the time
of valuation. ~This has not been followed s~nce the
in!tia! valuati0n.. Valuations have always been, fixed
~at lower figures than those represented by the
Values current at the time of fixing .in Order tO
preserve some uniformity with the .existing valua-
tions. Recent practice as .regards buildings has
been to fix valuations in the case of rented property
at about one-third of the .current. net reasonable
rental value and, in the case of-properties not
rented, at one-third of four per" cent..of their
capital values when occupied for trade or pro;
fessional purposes and one-third of :three per cent.
when occupied for residential or/farm purposes.
In this way an attempt has been~,made to ensure
that there is some semblance of.-omparability
with. properties valued in earlier years:
It is sometimes argued that the fact that-th’e
valuations do not represent contemporary values is
of little importance from a rating point of view for all
it means is that poundages are higher, the real
burden of rates not being-affected. This is true in a
very broad way~ But the point .which ’is’ Of crucial
importance is that there is no reason.to suppose that
the present values even if adjustedto, take account
of changes in the value of money would:be fair and
.I
equitable. It seems most doubtful if they would
reflect contemporary relativities. The best factual
evidence for this view is the results of the revision
of valuations in Galway and Buncrana ; for relative
valuations were drastically altered,s
Nor should this surprise us. Over a long period
of years relative values are bound to get out of line
unless there are systematic revaluations. We have
noticed what happens in connection with land. It is
similar in connection with other hereditaments.
Properties get altered and some of these get revalued
and others do not. Some of the properties which are
never altered greatly improve in value because of the
building of roads or parks or because some areas
just do become fashionable. Others fall in value for
similar sorts of reasons. Some property owners are
quick to appeal against their valuations others are
either lethargic or ignorant as to how to proceed.
Finally there is the great difficulty of carrying out
valuations on an artificial basis. It is difficult
enough valuing a piece of property at contemporary
values without having, as valuers had to do as late
as I945 Tor example, to value at i86o rental values..
If rates brought in small sums of money it would
not matter too much if the valuation system Was not
completely equitable. But--as we have seen--
rates bring in large sums of money, over £2i m. in
x959/6o,g An occupier of premises in an area with
a 40/- rate poundage suffers an excess rate burden
of £Io if the valuation of his property has an upward
error of £5 and there must be many errors, of this
Sort of order of magnitude.
Many reasons account for the present valuation
position. Probably the most’ impoffant is that the
Commissioner of Valuation has no initiative or
independent power with respect to revising valua~
t~ons. He can only act if invited to act.
In addition to the prox;isions for General Re-
valuations which now seem mo~ibund~° the pro-
cedure of the annual revision which we iioted above
(p. I4) could be used to secure a revision of valua-
tions other than land. Rate Collectors could submit
to the Commissioner of Valuation through the
relevantLocal Author!ty (and in fact at its instiga-
*See C. C. McEiligott, op. ~it., pp. IO6-Xo7.
8It is, perhaps, interesting to note by way of comparison
that the Net Receipts from Income Tax in I959/6o at £22.3
million were only very slightly more than the proceeds of the
Local Rates.
l°Section 34 of the 1852 Valuation Act empowers County
Councils to request a General Revaluation but as the County
concerned has to meet the full cost it is not, perhaps, surprising
that a request has never been made. Section 65 of the x898
Local Government (Ireland) Act gives the same ~oowers to
County Borough C6uneils and it was under this legislation
that the revaluations of Dublin and Waterford took place.
tion) a list with all the properties in the area 0n it
with a request that valuations be revised. This is
what happened in Galway and Bunerana. No other
Local Authority has acted in this way.
They have not asked for a number of reasons.
First, because it would affect the income tax
position. Though the aggregate rate burden might
not be affected by a revaluation the amount of income
tax paid by residents would go up unless special
legislation was introduced.1~ In the case of rating a
revision of valuations would increase the rate liability
of ,some but would reduce the rate liability of
others. In the case Of income tax all would lose
and none would gain. This constitutes a powerful
objection in any area against a revision. Then again
in the case of a single Urban District the effect o¢
a revision would be to increase its valuation relatively
to other parts of the county..In the case of services
which the County Council runs for the whole
county the cost is usually spread over the county in
accordance with net effective rateable values.. In
the absence of special treatment a revision of
valuations in one area would, .therefore, increase the
contribution it had to make towards the county
services. Thirdly, there is the problem of land which
particularly affects the County Councils..-Under
thisprocedure land valuations cannot be revised.
If a revision of hereditaments other than" land
took place an important effect would be that there
would be a redistribution of the rate burden from
occupiers of land to occupiers of other here ditaments.
Finally, th_ere is the general lethargy in many Local
Authorities and belief in the policy of " letting
sleeping dogs lie ".
Off a number of occasions legislation has been
before the D~il (notably in 1938) to bring, about a
reform of the present situation but~for a variety
of reasons--no new law emerged. This is un-
fortunate as even at best there are certain objection-
able features of rates as a tax.~           .
(e) Rates and Ability to Pay
It is generally agreed to-day that the taxation
demands on the citizen should be in relation to his
ability to bear the burden and that there are two
mair~ elements that determine this taxable capacity.
First, the size of the taxpayer’s income and, second,
the number o.f dependents that he has to support out
of his income. It Would: als0 be generally agreed
that given the number of dependents the tax
s3/stem, as a whole, should be progressive, i.e., that
" xISince Schedule A tax liability is linked to the valuation,s,
an increase, in such. valuations would increase the taxpayer s
taxable ’income and thus tend to increase his tax liability.
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the percentage of a taxpayer’s income going in
taxation should rise as his income rises. ~Beytnd
these relatively simple propositions it wguld
probably be difficult to get: general agreement. ~Views
as to the relief at different income levels that a tax-
payer should enjoy per dependent tend to differ
as do views as to the extent to which the tax system
should be progressive ; even if all are agreed that a
£I,OOo a year man should pay 15% of income in
taxation there would be considerable disagreement
as to whether the £2,5o.o a year man should pay
ZO~o, Z5~/o, 35~/o, ormore.      A .
Now when we talk of the tax burden on individual
taxpayers we are, of course, referring to the total
tax burden; the combination of income tax, the
various expenditure taxes, motor ~¢ehicle duties and
lo~I rates. It is quite unrealistic and misleading
in this context to examine the effect 6f any single
tax.in isolation from the effects of others. What is
important to a taxpayer is his aggregate tax burden
and not the amount he pays with respect to any
single tax. This point is particularly important
with respect to local rates. It is often argued that
local rates are a regressive tax--that, in broad
terms, tax payers with higher incomes tend to pay
a lower percentage of their income in rates and
that because they are not levied in accordance with
the ability to1 pay doctrine they should be con-
demned and perhaps abolished. Now this sort of
argument cannot be accepted for as we have argued
above--what is important is the aggregate tax
position and not the position with respect to
individual taxes. If the rate burden on individuals
is regressive and. the overall tax burden is pro-
gressive the regressiveness of the rates or of any
other tax "is of no great importance,t~
This does not mean, of course, that the effects
of a single tax on a particular class of persons may
not be so heavy as to produce an overall regressive
effect. The total tax burden on heavy smokers
considered as a class may well be regressive over
a considerable income range because of the heavy
taxation on this commodity. A heavy smoker
earning £500 a year may smoke as much as a heavy
l.lIn any complete analysis it is also necessary to take into
account the effects’ of government expenditure and consider
the total impact of the whole taxation’and expenditure system
on citizens in different income categories. In the ease of Ireland,
for example, any overall ,study of-the’effects of the public
finance system would have to take note of the fact that
individuals earning less than £8oo a year and farmers with
properties valued at less~than £50 may Clualify for free medical
services whereas those with larger incomes or properties do not.
It would alffo be desirable to take irito~" account the effect on
net incomes of other forms of State activity such as protective
duties, quota restrictions, or other import prohibitions. The
present Paper has left all these aspects On one side and has
concentrated on the narrow problem of the revenue aspects of
the finance of Local Authorities, .
smoker earning £700 a year or £i,ooo a year and
the tax liability arising from this activity may be so
great as to offset the "progressive" effects of other
taxes. Thus due to the operation of the tobacco
tax the tax burden, as a whole, may be regressive
over certain income ranges with respect to this
particular class of taxpayers (heavy smokers) and
from the "ability to pay criterion" this must be
judged to be inequitable.
Another effect of a particularly heavy~ rate of tax
On a commodity, the .consumption of which .can
yary widely, is that horizontal relationships get out
’bf line. Two men with the same taxable capacity--
one a non-smoker’who spends much money on
chocolates, the other a heavy spender on cigarettes
will contribute very different amounts to the
Revenue.
Clearly there w~ll always be some anomalies and
apparent inequities in any tax system which is not
composed/entirely of income taxes and, perhaps,
general sales taxes. What is important-is to ensure
that the inequities and burdens of individual taxes
do not become too great.
In our present context we have to consider what
inequities or anomalies are likely to arise with
local rates. It is believed there are a number of
ways in which rates may:cause particular classes
of taxpayers to have specially heavy total or overall
tax burdens relatively to other taxpayers with
similar taxable capacities.
A broad class of taxpayers which may be affected
in this way might be people~who-have-just ~etired
from active work but who quitenaturally::c0ntinue
to livein the house ?they occupied when working.
Their income is reduced and with it their income
tax, and as their expenditure drops their Contribution
by way of consumption taxes als0 falls.- .But their
liability to rates continues Unaltered" and may
constitute a very-heavy drain. These:people may
be forced by this heavy rate burden-to "leavetheir
houses, but so long as they remain the liability is
real and onerous.
Another class of persons may be farmers. Agri-
cultural land and buildings are rated but unlike
many businesses land and buildings constitute
substantial proportion of a farmer’s capital and a
tax which is levied on these forms of capital and
none other tends to affect agriculture more than
other businesses.
Clearly this argument applies less strongly to
those farmers whose occupation of land is small
relatively to their output. On the other hand it
applies with special force to farmer~ with a large
family for--unlike income tax--the single man
and the family man pay the same amount of rates.
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That farmers have special problems with respect .’:neg!ect the effects of other t.~txes; they, particularly
to this type of tax has been long recognised:, in .the-:’income tax, may already have operated to
¯ ;, ..-,~.-- ¯ .~,~ .
.
Ireland by the existence of the Agricultural Grant equ~F~’e, the relevant taxable capacity--that with
r, especg,:to post-tax income. However at the lowerand in the U.K., "for example, by the complete
derafing of agricultural land. ...
Another general class affected may be the whole~’’
body of ratepayers in a poor "district where heav~’.
rate burdens (with respect to incomes) may ’b~:~
imposed in the hope of raising enough revenue to
provide services at a level not too much"~be,]~
that. of richer areas in the State. In such circu~-
stances individuals with ~imilar taxable capacit, jes
will be making different total taxation contributionk:;
the taxpayer in the¯ relatively richer area paying less
than his opposite number in the relatively poor areas.
There are other 0bjectioia~ to rates. In recent
years there has been a great~increase~in the range
and variety of movable property that .is on the
market and which ’to a very substantial extent
competes for the citizens~ -expenditure with im-
movable property, people do compare and assess
the relative benefits that accrue from the acquisition
and occupation of real property.----housing:--with
the corresponding benefits that follow the purchase
of. different .types of motor car, television set,
washing machine Or refrigerator and---:to some
extent--againstthe benefits that ./tow from such
¯ service expenditure as foreign travel. With respect
to the taxable capacity of the ordinary citizen a tax
base confined to real property, excluding movable
or personal capital seems rather--unreal. ¯
Similar trends’ h~tve taken place over the years
.with respect to- businesses--including farms, Most
.business enterprises :are using a good deal more
Capital now than they were twenty years..ago.
There are-more tractors on the farms, more transport
equipment in-the form-of trucks and motor cars
and. genera!ly more capital" in industry and corn-.
merce, Almost certainly.-the increase in non-
rateable property has been far" in excess of the
increase in rateable or fixeff capital. Given that
there has-tO be a property tax a tax base-linked to
total "rather than to fixed Capita! would be much
more equitable~though much more difficult to
" adminisfer. " ’:       . ~
Finally there is the fact that a relatively well off
man~ can limit~" his l~abilit3~ to rates by living in
a small"house (though.the same argument can be
applied to any other butlay tax--a man can always
limit his !lability :tO the tobacco tax for example
by reducing his consumption of tobacco) and the
fact that¯ thefamily man needs greater acdbmmoda=
income levels when the)income tax is not an effective
tax thisis unlike-13r to h~ppen.
-One other point s~ould Perhaps be made in this
i:, context. Though-s-as mentioned in the introduction
~no attempt is being mad~oin the Paper to consider
the various reliefs~ and remissions¯ that are in exis-
tence with respelct to rat~ (except for a limited
discussion in th6 next section.~ of the role of the
Agricultural Grant) a brief m edition of. some of
them is desirable here. There"are a very large
number of reliefs and remissions which--with
the exception of the reliefs which are paid .f.0r bat
of the Agricultural Grant financed ~ from ~’~t~e
sources~have to be paid for by increasing the rate
burden on other, properties. Some Of the-main
concessions are as follows: =any~i~’iff~i!~e
arising from the erection or improvement of farm
buildings is free of rates for twenty years ; a similar
concession to that just mentioned exists with respect
to-all dwelling houses built in the Gaeltacht;
houses which have been built with assistance under
the Housing Acts x93z-x96o do not attract full
rares till they have been up for ten years ; under
the Undeveloped Areas Act .premises put up for
industrial purposes (as certified by An Foras
Tionscal~ in. undeveloped areas can qualify for a
two-thirds .rebate on¯ rate,, for ten years ; Electricity
¯ Supply Board premises used for generating and
transmission purposes are exempt from rates:;
hereditaments occupied by charitable and religious
organisations are exempt from rates and this is
interpreted very broadly. No estimate is available of
the total cost of these concessions but in total the3r
must amount to a very considerable sum.
Some of the concessions are, of course, only ,of
a temporary nature and it maTbe argued that ih the
long run because of,;the encofaragemenf given to
building through these various remissions the rate
position of the Local: Authorities will be improved.
It must also be remembered that a main purpose
of many of these remissions was to encourage:.:"
building and economic activity generally rather than
reaUocate the rate burden. However, the concessions
do reduce the income which is at the~ disposal of
the.-various Local Authorities and iff:view- of the
p~essure which exists upon their resources this is
to be regretted., Since the "remission legislation"
:is the work of the. Central G0vernment there is
tion than the single man with the same taxable calSa ..... surely a case for the Central ., Government making
city and will thus suffer~a heavier burder/from~ates. "special grants.,:availabl6"~to":theLoca] Authorities
In this latter case,’hbwever,~it is important not to in compensation for their loss of rate income. In
x7
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bdoing this the Central Government would be but (2) Tlm~;i~e buiMen:’of:~rafeson.farming income
following the practice that has been followed in as a wholeseems to be roughly twiceas high
connecti6ii with’the rate’remission judged desirable as that on the .inCome ,of the rest of the
for farmers, the State in this casemaking a.payment community, 15
direct to the’ Local Authorlties through the
Agricultural Grant, . - : " - (3) That;broadly speaking, rates are a propor-
The remissiOns also have the effect of reducing tional tax with respect to the non-farming
the total tax obligations Of the ratepayers who get community.
the concessions, relatively to’ other ratepayers, with ~’ :
the same overall taxable capacity, who do not. Rates have many ad~cantages as a revenue raisinginstrument f0r:Local Authorities. Theyare easyto
(d) Rates: Conclusion administer and xelatively Cheap to collect.; i:they
¯ ."~ do not give rise.to any demarcation problems ; their
In discusslng the burden Of rates on the public yield is relatively stable with respect to short
.we are hampered by the lack of reliable statistics, period fluctuations in the level of econgmj’ activity ~"
We do not know how the burden of taxation and, perhaps most important of all, people have
generally or rates in particular vary. from income become used to them if not reconciled to their
group to income group, or between-famxe~ and existence. ~Yet it isclear from.the previous section
industrialworkers, ~or between persons inthe.same that a formidable case can be built up against them
occupation with the same incomeiif aifferent parts on grounds of equity and when--as in _!ie!and--
_:of the State.~3 Due to the efforts of those respon- there is added to all these defects a completely.
sible for the National Farm Survey and the work out-0f-date system of valuation as the foundation
of the farmers’ organisations a good deal more of the: whole,system the~making of a worthwhile
is known about the agricultural sector than about
the position of other members of the eommuni~
defence of the rating system becomes exceptionally
........ difficult. -It would, of course, be unrealistic to think i i
though even here the picture is not entirdylclear~t4 of the abolition of the local rates oreven of drastic ,i-
In due course.it~ is hoped that the work now in changes in their scope...Local rates produce, con-
progress at the’Institute will throw considerable siderable sums of money and governments ~hnbt !i- i:
light on the relative burdens of rates in different easily give upcompletelyimportantreyenue raisers. : i-
areas and on different economic sectors. But this Two suggestions, however, seem-appropriate. " :~’work is by no mean.s complete..
First, if local rates are to continue tO bring in !. ~]~)
But though the material at present available is large sums of money t hen,!it;~:is~:~pormnt that - ~,:
not adequate to support any very firm conclusions hereditaments be revaluedi::So: as-~ t6:ehshre 6quityl~
~. tthere are some sources which it is believed c~in,be on this count as between oneratepayerand another.~,~ ¢~:"i
used t0:iiiustrate the orders of magnitude of certain The ..secOnd suggestion .is)less fundamental bur ~ ~’;.~ ~~i,
aspects of the problem. To emphas~se the fact that perhaps more important. Even-after a revaluation
the material is not really sufficiently.full or:reliable there would be--as we have ~seen~xmperfeetions
-to permit generalisations to be drawn, discussion in rates as with so man.y other tax~. They ar~
of it has been put in an Appendix. From the inflexible .with respeet io.’ Chan~es:inlnc0me~;"~ do ’
arguments and statistics there deployed the following not take account of family :resp6nsibilities ;: and hit
very tentative conclusions are suggested :-- hard consumers who prefer to ~spe~dI their money
on housing rather than,~in :otherdir.ections arid "’~
¯ (x) That rates are a progressive tax On farmers businesses which need ~~,high proportion of rated :~
and that the burden on the larger farms seems to non-rated capital. The;existence Of these im’per- ~!
¯ . to be yery.heavy, fections suggests the need:to keep: the level of ’~ ,
xs~M-t heroic attempt to produce a picture of theoveralltax rates reasonably low. : ’~ , : :,~ :-, ? , :
burd6n in relationto, particular income levels was made in a Many taxes hit certain sections Of the~c0mmunity :!i~
.Paper read to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Sodety in .....
March, x96x: L. Reason; " Estimates of the Distribution particularly ,hard. A good!tax: systemf flaerefore, "’
of Non-Agricultural Incomeand Incidence of Certain Taxes.". needs to. be (composed of .a.nuniber .~of: taxes so
This useful paper wil!,be iiuSllshed in-the x96o/6x Volume of that in total rough,justice will be done to all: Inthe Society’s-ProceeditigL~ ":7" ’"            " "
: :.. " " - - such a complex of taxes local rates’ have; their part
a*F6r some interesting illustrations of ~he burden of rates " " -
and taxation generally-on farfnerg:s~e :the Fourth ~Report of. "
. , .....
, . ~....- . _ ... _ ,. .
¯ ~’" ~mission on Income TaXation Pf- ~,~ i . esneciallv -x~It has, of course, to De rememDerea mat tlais is tlae Duraen
pp"’. 8x-x~’"oo. Itwill be dear- from~ffli~i3ai~li~a’t%~’th’at even of one tax only andthat at the higl~er"ineomes farmers may
with respect to agrieulture--tl/e--best :/t6cdfiiented sector of ,b6iaefit :in comparison with’other members.of the community
the economy--there is~ still ~e0pe.for disagr~ment-at the level--.~With:~imilar incomes-in that due, to~ th.e way, the mco.me, tax
of measurement as well as at the level of intdrlffe~ati6n; ¯ " is administerea mey ate more Or tess renevea ot suen ttaomty.,
’18
5
to Play--if’ only for: their~ ¯particularly ~desirabie
features as a tax for Local Authorities. But a
corollary is that the tax must not be pressed t9o
hard just because it is the only tax that the Local
¯ Authorities have.
The key .question here which has to be faced in
Ireland is ¯this. Given the various imperfections
which exist with respect to local rates is their weight
now too heavy ? As alrea.dy stated a good deal
more research needs to be done before a confident
answer could be given to this question., It is sus-
pected, however, that some classes of persons--f0r
example, medium siied farmer~ with large families--
are being hit fairly severely and this;" it is suggested,
implies the need--in the absence of slSec!al measures
to relieve this particular class of ratepayer--to
keep the general burden of rates unde~ very close
review in the hope of fifiding wiys to limit any
increases and perhaps to find @ays of bringing about
,2/a reduetion?S " i
i
+
(e)=Grants: General
We noted above how imi~ortant contributions
from the Central Gbvernment are in the finance of
Local Authorities; !in i959/6p grants ~mounted to
£22"9 m. or 43% ~of the total revenue. In the
same year the most important single grant amounting
to over £6.5 r~. w~s made towards thel cost of the
health service , expenditure of Local ’Authorities
under th~ authority of the Health Services iFinancial
Provision) Ac(I9471 ....Tiae Agficulturai-"Grant
amounted to over £5"5 m. and about £5 m~ was
teIt is sometimes argued that.there is no need to be worried
" about the burden of rates as’ with i’espeet to the G.N.P. the
burden is no greater than it was before the War. it must be
remembered, howe~cer, ithat other taxes are JaoW tnueh-m6re
important and this in6~eases the effective burden of Rates;
also that the burden in home areas has increased more than the
¯ average ; and that due to thd~ itnperfeetions in-the’ present
rating system certain groups of ratepayers may be hit very
severely. In c6nsidering-the" problem of %he rate;burden
being too heavy there is the eorresp0nding question--which is
indeed really the~ same one--as to the w~iy. ixi which the shbrt
fall in revenue is to be made tip if the yield of rates is reduded
and the need, in:such circumstances, to be able t6 show that the
new combination of taxes is superibr to the’old.
paid out to help the Local Authorities with their
expenditures on roads. Other important grants
were those 9f£!’9 m. towards the Cost of running
the mental hospitals and about £2 m. towards the
costs of the Local Authority Housing Programmes.
Though the detailed provisions~ of the Acts
under which the various grants are auth0ris~d vary
to a considerable extent, from our rat l~er broad
point of .view, almost all of them with the exception
of the agricultural grant, whose effects We ’examine
in some detail below, fall fairly clearly into the
"percentage" category we distinguished above.17
A few examples may illustrate the position. In
the case of the very large grant towards the cost
of the Health Services the amount granted to each
¯Authority amounts to 5o% of its expenditure on
recognised Health Services. In the case of roads
there are a number of different sorts of grantxs but
amongst them is the main road upkeep grant
Which amounts to 4o~ of approved expenditgre
on main roads.. ~In connection with their housing
schemes Local Authorities may receive a grant
amounting to up to ,two-thirds of the annual loan
charges relating to money borrowed in connection
with slum clearance schemes, the relief of over-
crowding schemes, or schemes for- re=housing
people living in unfit or cofidemned dwellings. For
houses built for more general letting the gmnt is
one-third of the relevant annual loan charges. , A
similar type of grant, i.e.,’ One related to the annual
loan charges on money borrowed is made available
in connection with expenditure on the various
sanitary services.
T~mLE 5: ,D~S,TRIBUT!ON OF GRAN, T~ (pERCENTAGE TYPE)
,, 
1959=69,
X~Seb pp. lO-X x above.
XSincluding, for example, large, sums of money granted
as one hundred per cent. grants for road improvement schemes.
One hundred per cent¯ grants have certain special characteris-
tics. Clearly they are a very powe’rful guiding and persuading
’ instrument. On the other hand it might be thought that they
do not suffer from one of the other characteristics of percentage
grants namely serving to help those who can help themselvdk.
However, in many cases they ,do, as the hundred per cent.
grants l are really in the"’nature of-capital grants and an
’Authority’s ability to use such grants does depend:to some
extent fat any rate upon its ability in the future to afford the
higher, level of maintenance charges which will normally--
though notalways~be "assOciated with new capital projects.
£000
/
Public Mental Sanitary General Total -
Roads , Assistance Hospitals Health Services Housing. Purposes Grants
County Councils " . /;:.-’ -"4,954"4~ 53"4 " ¯ 1,5o9.3 .4~741"8 " ] "202’I ¯ "78o’4 ~38,4~ 12,479"8
(39"7 %) (0.4%) (~2"~ %) (38.0 %) (I’6 %) (6.~ %) (1"9 %) (~oo.o)
Urban District Councils Io5"5 71"4 379’9 65"7 622"5
County Councils plus .... 5,059"9 53"4 I;509~3 4,741.8 273"5 1,160’3 3o4.I 13,IO2"3
U.D. Councils" (38’6 %) (0"4 %) (u’~ %) (36"2 %) (2" 1%) (8"9 %) (2"3%) (IOO’O)
County Borough CounciJs     319;2 364"6 1,773"9 ¯ 66"3 954"6 "I96’9 - 3,685"9
...... ~+ (8"~ %) (o’~ %) (9"9%) (48.1%) (1.8 %) (25¯9 %) (5"3%) (lOO.O)
I 63"9 1,87Y9 . 6,515"7 339"8 ¯ 2, I I4"9
’ 50I’0 " 16,788"3
Totifl" (0"4 %) (i 1.2%) (38.8 %) (2.o %) (,2’6 %) I¯ [ 51379r.. (3~’o %) (3"0%) (10010)
¯
’
.i’ ¯ , !,’L: "
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T~LE 6 : GRAN~I~. (PERCENTAGE TYPE) AND REVENUE’-EXPENDITURE., ~x959/6o
" " £ million
- . ’, ¯ ¯ .
County Conad/a : . ’’
Expenditure~. ... . .!.
Grants ......
Net Expenditure ...
Grants as- % of Expen-
’ diture ... .. ....
% Distribution of Net
xo~5
4"9¯
: 5’6
46%
Expenditure. , ""
Cmmty Councils plus U.D.
> Councils:
¯ Expenditure ...-    ...
Grants ...
Net Expenditure : :..
Grants .as :,%-of ’Expen,
diture -
% Distribution-of i~et
Expenditure.    ...
con.~ z)~hC~’~ :
Ext~ndit~re .., : ’...
Gfimts . . .......
Net., Expenditure    ...
Grants as % of Expen-
diture     ¯     ...~
% Distribution of Net
Expenditure ~ ....
All Au~a~ :- "
Expenditure . .....
Grants ...
Net Expenditure
Grants as¯ % of Expen-
diture     ¯ ... ...    46 %
, % Dhttributioia of Net
Expcndi~re      "" I ¯ 17.%
Public
Assistance
: 0.8
O’I -
0-7
12%
3%
0’8
O’I
¯
- 0"7
_ i2%.
-26%
. xo’8
’ 5"1
5’7,,
/ -% "47 :
o
¯ 22%,- 3Yo.
0.8 ~ ,,:--.-o.2
¯ o’3 .~ ," . o:o
O;5 , 0’2, .
37% ":
4% . 2% -
xx.6 ,x.o
5"4 " , "O’I
6’z 0"9 ’
" 2%
Mental
Health
3"3
1"5
1"8
45"%
8°/o~
... 3’3
. , )r’5
45%
7%
¯ %
¯, 0"90"40"5
44%
4%
" 4"2
1"9
z’3
45%
o
-
" Sanita~ .... " :’:General
. Health Services Housing Purposes i. Total
" - 10’4~t " :- x.’5 ’ 3"7 ’ 3’9 " ’34"2. "
4"7. ’ o’2 : .0"8 - o’2 12’5
5"7 1"3 2"9 " 3"7 2I’7
45% 13%’ :Z~% : . :.5% " 36%
26% " 6% " 13%: :. , 17~/o ..IOO% "
1o’4 2"2- 5"I .’5"7’’ ’: 3825
’4"7 -0"3 z’2 0"3 I3’X
¯ .-5’7. ’x’9 ". 3"9 " 5"4 ,25"4’
45% . 14% 23% " 5% 34%
L
.. -.
’ :2
2=% 7% 15% , Zi% ioo%
4"0 ,/ 2"1 4"4 .
~ 2;4 - ’,, I4"8
1’8 o.z -~ o:9.. o.z --’ 3"7
=’2 2"0 )3"5 2’2 II’X
45%~     5% -zo% 8%:’ .25%
20%    18% 32% . ~o%-/ i¯oo°~
. .,.> . ".. ," .+ .,    . . -:/:" . .
I4;4 4"3 9’5. -" "8"1 ’ 53"2
6"5 . 0"3 2"x 0"5 . ,., 16.8
7"9 .... 4"0 . . 7;,t - ¯7.6 . 36"4¯
45% - 7% " .22.%... >:6%’. i."32%
220//0" "" iI% 20%" . ." :~i’,%’ ! I00%
#&
County Councils
T~]~,.7~ .DISTRIBUTION ETC.’OF TOTAL GRANTS, 1959-6b
Percentage
Grants
Urban District Councils 63=’5
County Councils plus
Urban District Councils ,
1
County Borough Councils 3,686"9
- . ..... ¯ ..... (94"o%)"
; 16,789,2
" " Total ... 03,6%),
Agricultural
¯ Grant
5,544"7
’ (3o’4%)
1¯3,102"3.. 5;544"7
(69"4 %) (29"4 %)
, . - ,-. ,
Other " Total
GrantsG Grants!./
185"8 .18,210,3
(I.’O %) " (!OO’O) -
43"8: 666.3 "
229"6 I8;876"6(x ~= %) (zoo.o)
£ooo
6.2 2=7.0
(0.2%) ..... (5.8%)
5,550:9 456"6
(24"4 %) ’ (a.o %)"
Percentage
Grants as
% of Total
Expen-
diture
/.
36.5% "
14.5%
Total.,
Grants as
% of
Expen,
. diture
53;3% -i
xS:6 °/o .:.
34"1% 49"z % "
3:926.:i:’,. :.’.. :.,
- . -
(1oo’o) 24"9%-- 26"5%-
22,796"7 31 ’5 % 42.8 %(~oo.o)
Percentage    Total ,
Grants as Grants’ as
% of % of "
Rate Rate
:- Income i Income
104:5 % 252"4%
¯ 26(] % " 27"9 %
91"4%" x31"7%
.--52"1%.: ~55"4%
78"4 % 166~5 %
if:
t
!
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NOTES ON TABLES 5, 6 AND 7
I. ~ollf$e : Returns: of. Local Taxation.
2. Other Grants in Table 7 are State Contributions in lieu of Rates.
3L The Rate In’come base on which the final column in Table~-7 is calculated incliides Increases in Rents Of small
dwellings. ~ . " ..... " "
4;" The total of grants in Table 7 at £2=.8 million is less than the £22"9 million ih Table :3 as the latter figure includes ’
the grant Of £zoz,5o2 made to the Separate Public Assistance Authorities for Health (see Table~ X~. IX of Returns, of Local
Tax’on, 1959/6o).and various Other small grants such as that of £I6,931 to various Nlentai Hospital Boaras Isee tame 2~
Of Returns of..Local Taxation).: " __: " " ~, " "
20
I,
i)¯
Table 5 Shovcsi:the allocation of percentage type
grants to the~vari0i~sLoq/fl Afithorities a~d how they
were divided as:bet-~/eet~,the, ~arious services) Table
6 shows the i/~P~0rtance :6fth~segrants with respect
to the level 6f,/expenditute on.various services by
the different. Authorities. Table 7 shows the
importance of grant~)aS a whole (percentage grants
plus¯ the AgriculturaiGrant) with respect to the
level of expenditure and the level¯ of rate income of
Local Authorities.
On th%whole the tables tell their own story
but it is desired to emphasjse two points. " - ¯
Table 6 indicates the different degrees of support
which ihe State giyesto various Local Authorityservices. It is clear.¯ tha
t
’ in the case of Roads,
Mental Health and Health State support is heavy
being about 45¯ per.cent, of total revenue expenditure
in each¯case. In the case of.housing, too, there is a
considerable degree of helii~amoUnting to some
20 per cent. of Revenue Expenditures.. . :What is,
perhaps, surprising is the small support given
with respect to Geneial Purposes Expenditures.z~
To some extent, ihowever, this is misleading.
Two large items under this heading a~re Local
Authority grants .to’Vocational Edueatibn~,Com-
mittees and to Committees of Agriculture. In
1959/6o such grants, hmounted to £o.7 "million and
£0"3 million resP’edtively. In addition to these
Local Authority.~grants the Committees received
State grants in 1959/6o amounting to £1.2 million
in the case of Voqational Education and £oi.3 million
in the case Of Committees of:Agriculture. These
State grants do not appear in the statistics set out.
in Tables 5, 6 and 7 as, technically, Vocational
Educati~sn C0inmittees aiid’C0-ihmitte-es of Agric-fil:
ture are not part of the normal L0caLAuthority
system. It is, however
, 
desirable to note the effect
of this administ~ativdfactor. This can be done in
tWO ways. If the direct State grants’ are taken:into
account (i.e., if we think of Vocational Education
Committees and Committees of. Agriculture as
being part of the Local: Authority system) then
the ratio gralats :as;a percentage of total:’expenditu?e
for all Authorities inTable 6 would increa~eirr thecase of General. Putpt~es Expendlture"from’/6 per
cent. to zz-per cent." If, on the other hand, we
completely exclude the. t~vo items (i.e., ignore
completely, the’ _grants-/-~vhieh’L0cal Authorities
make),then the ratiorises fr0m.6 per cent. to.7 per
cent.    " " ....
~~ " " :::i() " ....
For services :~other: !t~ah, Vocationai";Edlacatioia
and the .work of.. Committees of Agriculture the
point remains :,-State support is not’/g?eat .and: this
: -,.. . .?. ". . ,-    ,, . ,..f:~ j’~ " ..- ? -
x~See Note ~ to Table;i-for a list of.some.of-the items’0f
expenditure included under th{s tidadifig ~ " ~ ....
. "" "i ";."" % f.
must tend to ’ reduce the expenditure which Local
AUthorities feel.able to allocate :to them’fr0m their
own resources. - - .."-. 5, ,. ~- ~,
The second point relates particularlyto Tables 6
and 7. In Table 7 it is shown that.in the case of the
County Councils (including U.D. Councils) :some
34 per cent. of total expenditure is financed by
percentage grantsand some 49 per Cent:by Central
Government Grants. as a whole. !n-:.th6 case of
County Boroughs,.--.hpwejcer, ¯ thei-c0rresp0nding
percentages-are e5 per cent. and ~6"}.per:cent. Now
the main reasorLfor the difference in :thg, overa.ll
figure :is,~,qf..:course,; the fac, t that the :.County
Boroughs hgi~dly receive/anY~support thrhugh the
Agricultural Grant. But eyen when’ it ,is excluded -
.there is still-’the difference-as between the:relative?
importance of per~en"tage grants.~ Table 6 indicateff
~. the reason for thiS; It i~rises mainly out of the high
level ofCouhty,’Cdiin6ifi:expenditure-on roads and
tge fact that aigo, od.PrePPYtion 0fthis expenditure
is financed by zoo per cent. grants.~° This expen-
diture attractsa large grant, income which pushes
up the a;eerage,for County Councils as a whole.
The end result isprimarily a reflection of the
different expenditure-.,patterns ; whereas County
Councils devoted over a third of their ."’.Gross "
expenditure to roads, County Boroughs’de;coted
about five per cent.
y
(f) The Agricultural Grant~t
The Agricultural Grant is paid to County Councils
to enable" them without loss to themselvesJt0 reduce
the rate burden on the occupiers~of agricultural
land. At the present time the total grant amounts
to the sum needed to give relief of rates on (a)three-
fifths of the general rate in the~,pound on land
valuations up to £~o and on the ~first £eo of Ta.lua-
tions over that figure--th!~, is known as the Primary
Allowance--and (b) to/provide an Employment
Allowance of £zTin respect of each qualified
workman subjec~ to--the limit that the total of
employmer/t allowances should not exceed the rates
on land values over~ £eo.
~°See footnote x8 above.
~XTlais seeti0n is not intended to be a compreizensive£tudy
.ofJ~he effects of-the agricultural grant. Here Xve~.are only
interested in the more or less direet effeets it has on the level
"of rates and no attempt is made to consider such important
aspectsof the agrieflltflral grant as the justification for sub-
sidising employment. No attempt is made to trace the various
’changes that have been made in the grant since it ~v~is first
introduced under seeti0n 48 of the Local G0vernmer/t:(Ii’eland)
Act z898. ,Nor is there any diseussion of some of theproblems
"which" i~re faced in administering the grant.
2I
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The County Councils are authorised by State
legislation to make these concessions which
amounted to over £5"5 million in x959/6o and
they are eventually reimbursed for them by the
State. Some 8o per cent. of the total agricultural
grant in x959/6o was made available as Primary
Allowances.
The Primary Allowance
In considering how the Primary Allowance works
it will be Convenient to see, first, how it operates
within a given Local Authority area and then to
look at some of the factors that are important in
bringing about the allocation as between counties.
Within each county the Primary Allowance
operates in a very straightforward way as illustrated
in Table 8 below.
suggested that the impact of rates on the medium
and large farmers was probably excessive relatively
to other ratepayers and that this might justify
some special relief. It is doubtful if the Primary
Allowance can be regarded as meeting this need
as its assistance to this¯ class of farmers is not great ;
farms with rateable values of £75 only getting their
net rate obligations reduced by i6 per eent.~n
our Table example--and those with rateable values
of £IOO by I2 per cent.
The points we have just made with respect to the
Primary.¯ AllowanCe apply" to every County taken
separately. No matter what the rate poundage the
percentages in the final column of Table 8 would
be the same for farms of the same rateable value.
Thus within each County the Allowance may be
regarded as a proportional 6o per cent. sub-
TABLE 8: OPERATION OF THE PRIMARY ALLOWANCE.
(A 4o/- Rate Poundage is assumed.)
Rateable Value of
Farm ~ ~
xo R.V. ....
~ x5 R.V. ~ ...
£ 2o R.V.
£ 3° R.V.
£ 5° R.V.
£ 75 R.V.
£xoo R.V.
£I5o R.V,
£2oo R.V.
,o.
¯ .. i
Gross,~ Rate - "
Obligation:
£ "
20
3°
4°
0 ¯ ",
i6o
I50 .
20O
3oo
400
AgricuKural
Grant ,
£
12
i8¯
24
24
24
24
24
24
24    :
Net ~ Rates
Payable
£
/
12
.16
36
76
¯ 126
176 .
276
376
Net Rates/as .%. of
Gross Rates *I
o%
40%
40%
¯60%
76%
.84%
88%
92%
94%
Farms of up to £zo rateable value obtain relief sidy of the rates payable with respect to farms
with respect to their total rate obligations ; receiving having a valuation of up to £2o and a declining
through the Allowance 60 per cent. of their gross (~percentage subsidy of the rates payable with respect
rate obligations. Farms with valuations more than to farms with rateable values above that figure.
£2o only receive by way of the Allowance 60 per
cent. of gross rates on £zo rateable value which,
with the assumed rate poundage in the table,
amounts to a relief of £24. Thus as the size of farms
(by rateable value) increases the ratio of net rates
payable to gross rates goes up.
It is clear that the Primary Allowance is mainly
of benefit to the smaller farmer in the sense of its
leading to a substantial percentage reduction in the
gross rates payable. However, all farmers---even
the largest and richest in the State---benefit by the
relief on £zo of rateable value. On the assumption
that the object of the Allowance is to help the
small farmer this must J6e regarded as an
anomaly.
In our discussion earlier in the Paper it was
This amounts to saying that the burden of rates
on farms of up to £20 valuation is reduced propor-
tionately : an equal percentage gain accrues to the
£I0 rateable value and the £20 rateable value farm.
There is thus no redistributive or equalisation
element with this group of farms. With farms with
valuations above £20 there is a redistributive
element as the effect of the allowance is to increase
the degree of. progressiveness in the Gross Rates
position by providing a declining percentage
contribution by way of relief ; the larger and richer
farmers gaining a much lower percentage relief
on his gross rates than the smaller and poorer
farmers.
An examination of the factors:)affecting the
distribution of thePrimary Allowance as between
22
Counties is less straightforward. Four rather
different considerations have their effect.
In the first place it is obvious that an important
factor is the distribution of land holdings. If the
land was distributed in such a way that no holding
was valued¯ at more than £20 rateable value all land
in the State would qualify for relief from rates
through the Primary Allowance. If, however, some
land is held in holdings of more than £20 rateable
value then a part of the land of the State and of a
County will not qualify for relief, the proportion
depending on the particular distribution of land
(measured by valuation),             ¯
Now there are big differences in this respect
from one county to another ; at one extreme there
is Mayo where in 196o 9° per cent. of total holdings
had a valuation of less than £2o rateable value and at
the other Kilkenny with only 53 per cent. of holdings
having a valuation of less than £2o. Columns x
and 2 of Table 9 set out some information with
respect to the distribution of land measured by
rateable value.
TABLE 9 DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS AND AGRICULTURAL GRANT, ETC.
Holdings above Distribution Di.stribution
% of Holdings £IOO R.V. of Primary of Employment
County under £.2o R.V. Allowance Allowance
No.,    % 000 £ooo
I. Carlow ..¯. 6o 312 6 58"O 28"O
2. Cavan ... 69 xo6. i 203 "7 22 "8
3 Clare ... 68 268 2 209.6 31.0
4. Cork ...... 62 1,438 4 478 "2 161.i
5. Donegal ... 86 274 ~ I 234"8 27"9
6. Dublin ... 63 723 9 59.8 38"5
7. Galway ... 75 233 i I 438"7 38"0
8. Kerry .... 81 IO4 * 271 .o 28.3
9. Kildare ... 64 729 9 91 "2 5o’3
xo. Kilkenny ... 53 667 7 ¯ . 115.3 62.2
xI. Laoighis ... 58 384 5 io2.o 37"4
12. Leitrim ... 86 23 * 129-6 6.I
13. Limerick ... 62 769 5 181"7 75 "5
14. Longford ... 7° I57 2 III"7 15"7
15. Louth ... 65 398 6 69.o "’.: 30"2
16. Mayo ....... 9° ~ 83 * 324’3 14"3
17. Meath .... 54 1,2o6 9 126.3 69.o
18. Monaghan ... 62 I49 x 147.7 22"4
19. Offaly¯      ... 59 ’ 3oz 4 I18"7 33"I
zo. Roscommon 7° I85 I 233"8 19.2
zI. Sligo ...... 77 8I I I50"9 I3"I
z2~TipperaryN.R. I30"3 42 "4
23., Tipperar~ S.R. tI’°7 I25"5 55"9
...
{
55
6I
}
~4. Waterford 556 7 IO0"l 41 "4
~5. Westmeath ... 58 564 6 i2o.8 3I’8 .
~6. Wexford ... 61 582 5 138.o 73 "9
~7. Wicklow ... 63 439 6 76.6 31 "O
TOTAL ... [ 69
¯ I 1,805 ! 3 4,547"7 I,I00"7
*Less than o.5%.
NOTES ON TABLE 9
x. Sources : Holdings. Statistics for x96o have been supplied by the Department of Local:Government. The latest
year for which information has been published is 195o (see Table 8x of 196o Statistical, Abstract).
Agricultural Grant. Statistics for x96o/6x have been supplied by the Department of Local Government. The latest year
for which information has been published is I958/59 (see Appendix II of x958/59 Report of Department of Local Government).
2. A Holding is defined as all land used wholly or partly for agricultural purposes that is operated as a single holding
or property.
3. Valuations in the table include land and agrieuhural buildings. The buildings tend to have a very low valuation.
4. The percentage distribution of the Agricultural Grant is shown in Table I8.
23
Oilier th-ingsbeing equal a county will receive a higher grant than:A,i,e/,::that,~thb citizem of-B
a bigger share of the Primary Allowance ~the higher receive greater Support fro~,flaei:state :than the
the proportion Of its total land Valuation that qualifies citizens of A, who are~ after)all; Pr0bablyi making the
for the grant. Broadly:speaking;:fhei~efore, a county same contribution by Way.of general:taxation to the
of Small~ farniers benefits more than a county of State as the’citizens of B.. : /’: "
large farmers ......... - .... Other ¯things being equal, theref0re, the more
The Second:factor which is important, is the a Local Authority chooses to:tax itS-residents the
amount of money-which fin Authority wishes to more that area will receive thrbugh::,th6 operation
Spend. Consider two counties A ~and B alike in of the Primary Allowance~both absolutely and as a
all respects except that B has a high level of expen- share of the available funds. : ...... :’ ;"
diture and, therefore, a higher rate poundage: The third :factor concerns ;the valuation~,0f an
Table xo sets out the problems. ~ area. Earlier in the Paper reasonswere given why
.... TABLE ,0: THE PRIMARY h:LLOWANCE IN’TWO COUNTigS (A’ANi:i::B) ..............
Rateable :
Value of
Farm :
£ .x5 :R.V.
£ ~-o R.V.
£ 3° R.V.
£ 50 R.V.
£ioo, RN.:
TOTAL ...
Rate:P0undage
...... A.i: .
f ¯
4o/: ’
4o/-:
40/-
40/-
40/-
50]_ ¯ ¯
50/-
50/-
50/-
50/-
Primary 7
Gr0ssRates - Allowance ’
A    B A B’
3o ~ 37"5 i8 2z’5::
4° : 5° 24 3°
75 24 3°
125 24 3° ¯
25° 24 3°
f-. -:,
50/- 43° " 537:5
60
.ioo
2OO
40/-
As expected from our earlier’ discussion the
ratios in the final columns of the table are equal.
What is different and important is that B gets: a
bigger Primary Allowance; £142"5 instead of
£ii4.o; an increase of 25 per cent. in line with
the increase in rate: poundage. B will, .therefore,
get a bigger share of the total available funds than A.
Looking at it from the point~ of view Of the
individual farm no real objection can be taken tO the
farms in B getting ~e same percentage relief as the
farms in A. Yet it is doubtfulif the overalllresult
is entirely Satisfactory. The citizens 0~ B have
decided to tax, themselves more heavily than the
Citizens Of A in order (in our example) to have a
higher level of services. This is entirely the concern
of B. But the result of the decision is that B receives
TJmt~ xz : PRIMARY ALLOWANCE
Net Rates as %Net Rates of. GrOss ¯Rates ~.
B
36      45: 60-¯ . 60 ¯
.76    95; 76 76
~76 ~ 229i 88 ¯ 88
114 I42"5 3i6"o 395i 73’5 :7= ~’- 73"5
=it is likely that relative valuations as.between
counties!are now out of line.; This can affect the
distribution of the Primary Allgwance. - : : ....
Consider two c0unties A hnd C. ’:Let :A have
the same characteristics as A in our! p~evious
example. Let C bdl equivalent in all respe~ts~--size
and number of farms, quality of land; ctc.--=exccpt
that for historical reasons valuations (for identical
farms) a~ lower than in A b# 20 percent. Let us
assumc-~lUite reasonably that C wishes t0have
the same expenditure and raise the same revenue’
as A. Conscious of the fact that her rateable value
is only 80 per cent.:that of A,.C levies the higher fate
poundage necessary to bri~ag in the same gross rate
income ; a rate poundage 25 :per cent. high:er than
in A, i.e., 5o/-. Table xx indicates the end result.
IN TWO COUNTIES (A AND C).            Y -
c< Rateable Value
of Farm
£,
A
I5,
20    "
,3°
50‘
IOO
a4
~ Rate ~ Poundage
"C
i2 4o/-
40/-
24 40/-
4o .4o/-
" 80 40/-
’72 4oi
A    C
50/-"
5o/--:
:5o/-:
5o/-,
¯50/=
" 5o/- ~
Gross Rates
A C
3° 3°
4° 4°
60 60 .
. IOO , IOO
- 200 200
/.
43°    43°
Primary
¯ .A!19_wance ¯
£
:A
. C
18 . x8
, 24 24
.. 24 3°
24 3°
24. 3°
114 132
Net Rates , Net Rates as %
-£ - ~. of Gross Rates
What is important is the difference in the Primary
Allowance and Net Rates columns. C receives a
higher Primary Allowance and this, of course,
reduces the Net Rates payable. This effect is
caused by the lower valuations in C enabling a
higher proportion of the total valuation to qualify
for the allowance. It follows that the lower the
valuation that is put on land of a given quality the
greater the. gain to an area through the Primary
Allowance; moreover the benefit does not accrue
to the smallest farms.
The fact that the allocation of the Primary
Allowance is influenced in this way underlines
again the need for a revaluation of hereditaments.
The fourth factor concerns the role of the
Primary Allowance in helping to even out differences
in wealth or income between two Local Authorities.
Consider County A again and in addition D which
is assumed to have only 8o per cent. of the rateable
value of A, the same number of inhabitants and
farms, and with its land ¯distributed in the same
broad fashion.22 Now if D applies the same rate
poundage as A (Columns D1 in Table 12) gross
rate income will be £344 which is--as .in A--2oo
per cent. of total rateable value2~, Net Rates will
be £238’4 or 139 per cent. of rateable value com-
pared with I47~er cent’ in A and the Primary
Allowance willbe £1o5.6 or 6i per cent. of rateable
value compared with 53 per cent. in A.
2qn this example it is assumed that relative rateable values
do represent real relative values.
ZsOn the assumption that rateable values do represent real
differences in quality comparisons of the relationship between
rates and rateable values may ,be used as a reasonably good
indicator of the relative burden of rates.
TABLE I2 (a) : ’ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR.COUNTY D.
Net Rates’as °/o
of Gross
Rates
A D t DN
Total Rateable Value ...... £215 £172 - £172
Rate Poundage ......... 40/- 4o/- 50/-
Gross Rates ......... £43° £344 £43°
Primary Allowance ...... £114 £1o5"6 £132
Net Rates ......... £316 £238"4 £298
Net Rates as % of Gross Rates 73 "5 69"3 69"3
Gross Rates as % of R.V....
¯ 200 2o0 250
Net Rates as % of R.V.      :.. 147 139 173
Primary Allowance as % of R.V. 53 61 77
Primary
Allowance
£
Gross Rates
£
Net Rates
£Rate Poundage
Rateable iValue
of Farms i~ Dt
As ~ in
,D’t
To raise
¯. same
income
as A
£ D! D tl D t D l! D t D r! D I D I!
4°
4°
50
70
85
69 "3
40/_ ’
4o/-
4o/-
/40/-
4o/-"
sol-
so&
5o/-
so&
50/--
18
24
3°
3°
3°
9"6
12"8
24
56
136
I2
16
24
4o
80
24
32
48
80.
16o
3°
4°
60
IOO
200
14’4
19"2
g4
24
24
I2
16
3°
70
17o
4°
4°
50
7°
85
4o/- . 50/- 43° lO5"6 [132 238.4’ 298    69"3TOTAL I72 344
TABLE I2 (b): A COMPARISON OF A AND D
These figures might seem to suggest that the
Primary Allowance is having a redistribufive
effect for the Allowance in D--the assumed poorer
county--is a higher proportion of rateable value
and of gross rates than, in A. It is believed that
this would not be a completely fair interpretation
of the statistics. For as the total level of Income in
D--and presumably the level of expenditure--is
lower than in A the comparison is not really
justifiable, It should hlso be noted that the total
allowance--and, therefore, in our example allowance
per farm and per capita--is lower in D than in A.
: The Columns headed D" (in Table I2 (a)) show
the position when D’s income is the same as in A
and Table 12 (b)shows the summary position for
A, D’ and D". To obtain the same income as A,
D must levy a poundage of 5o]-. This leads to
net rates of £298 or 173 per cent. of rateable-value
2,5
,f
and a Primary Allowance of £x32 or 77 per. cent of
rateable value.
A comparison of A with D" is the ¯right com-
parison to make in considering the extent to which
the Primary Allowance has a general redistributive
element.
The grant /s redistributive in the sense that a
higher total grant goes to the poorer Authority.
Other things being equal, therefore, the poorer
county will get the bigger grant, But there is a cost
involved. To get .the bigger grant" the poorer
area has to impose a higher rate of taxation--D"
Net Rates on average~are 173 per cent. of rateable
value whereas in A they are i47 per cent. The
Primary Allowance is not sufficiently redistributive
to bring about an equalisation of rate burdens at
the same level of incomes. And, as we saw in
connection¯ with D’, if a poor Local Authority felt
it could 0nly imp0se the same burden of rates on
its residents as in A24 then not only would its
level of expenditure be less but it would receive
a smaller absolute amount and percentage share of
the available funds.
In the above discussion we have isolated four
rather different factors affecting the distribution of
the Primary Allowance. The allocation that
emerges--which is set out in Table 9mis the
resultant of their various pressures. By no means
do they all operate in the same direction: Mayo
t~That is to say the same ratio of gross rates to rateable value.
"TABLE x3: THE EMPLOYMENT ALLOWANCE: SOME EXAMPLES.    :
and¯ Donegal, for instance, may ’gain’ through
the operation of Factor i but lose through the
operation of Factor 4; Kerry may gain under
Factor 3 btit lose under 4; Waterford may gain
under 2 but lose under I and so on. Indeed, some
of the rather odd features of the distribution
which we Will be looking at in more detail in the
next Section of the Paper are probably explained
by the complex of causes operating to bring it
about.
The Employment Allowance
The Employment Allowance is best regarded as
a direct offset to rates. For every man employed
the rates payable are reduced by £17 so long as this
does not reduce the rates payable on the first
£2o of valuation. To qualify for the allowance a
farmer must have employed a workman on his
holding during the whole of the precediag calendar
year. Indeed, the main purpose of the allowance
is to persuade the farmer to keep his workers on
for the whole year and not dispense ,with them
during the winter months. To discuss the broad
economic arguments for and against attempting to
do this would take us too far from the main theme
of the present Paper. It seems doubtful, however,
if a payment of £17 as a subsidy in relief of rates
per person employed¯ a whole year is likely to be
a particularly powerful inducement for a farmer to
keep on someone he would not have¯ kept on anyway.
b,
.: q
Type of Holding
IOO R.V.
No employees...
I employee ...
2 employees ...
£ioo R.V.
No employees ...
i employee ...
~: 2 employees ...
~I50 R.V.
No employees’~:.i
x employee ...
2 employees ....
3 employees ..,
£!5o R.V.,
No employees ...
¯ x employee ...
Z employees...
3 employees ....
Rate .... Gross
POundage ¯Rates
£
. 20/-- I00
20/-- 100
" 20/-- 100
4o/-
40/-
40/-
2o/-
20/-    :
20/--.
¯ 20/--
2OO
¯ 200
15o.
¯ 150 ...-
15o
15O. ,
40/- .. (’3oo,
4o/- 3oo
4o/-. 3oo "
’ 4o/- -,3oo
¯ Primary
Allowance
*’~L~- £ " .
12,
I2
I2
24
24
24
12 , .
I2
12
" " 12
¯ Employ-)
ment ~:,:
Allowance
£
¯ 17
34
17
; 34
24
¯ 24
24-
24
.. ’i7 .
34
51
17
34
5x
Employ--:
merit
Allowance
as % of
Gross .
Rates
17-
I7
8"5
17
II"3
2¯2"7
34
5"7
-iz.3
i7’
¯ Net
. Rates
£
88
71
54
176
159
142
.. 238
" 121
104
87
276
259
242
: 22S
, r..
Net
O ¯
as" ~/o~
of(Gross
Rates
~
88
.7! v
54
¯ " ’      z:
- 88:
79
,,71 ..’
92.
81 -
69
.:... 58 ’
92.
86.,
8I
:    ¯ 75: ¯’
3
i
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Table 13 indicates how the employment allowance
works. In all cases, no matter what the rate
pound~ige, rateable value or the number of workers
employed, the relief per man employed is the
same.25 Since the allowance is a given sum of
money it follows that the percentage benefit per
manlis less the greater the gross rates payable. In
the Table, for example, the ratio net to gross rates is
higher for farms of the same size when the rate
poundage is higher and higher for farms which are
larger when the rate poundage is the same. Thus
considering those farmers that benefit from the
allowance it is probably redistributive. On the
other hand those farmers who receive it at all are
probably better off than those who do not qualify
and in this sense, the more important sense, the
allowance is the opposite of redistributory.26
It is probable, too, that the areas in which
agricultura! employment is centred are richer areas
than those where one man farming is the rule, and
from this side also the element of redistribution in
the employment allowance is slight.
(g) Conclusion on Grants
It is not easy to know where exactly to put the
agricultural grant into our classification of per-
centage, equalisation and general grants. It is not
an equalisation grant, though it does have some
redistributive features. It has, however, attributes
of both a general and a percentage grant. As
regards the former type it is not linked to expenditure
on any specific service and it is in part--though
only in part--determined by objective factorslsuch
as the number of persons employed in agriculture,
and the proportion of agricultural holdings which
are under £2o rateable value. On the other hand
there are attributes which one would normally
associate with percentage grants. For, as we have
seen
, 
the amount of the grant does tend to vary
with the level of expenditure of the Authority. Thus
the more that is raised in gross rates the more is
received by way of agricultural grant.
Having looked at the grant system generaUy it
is clear that it does not contain our " ideal " com-
bination of general or neutral grants, redistributive
or’equalisation grants, and percentage grants. On
the contrary percentage grants dominate the scene;
25So long, of course, as the operation of the allowance is
not limited by the constraint that the ratepayer must pay an
amount in rates equal to the rates on the first £2o of rateable
value--reduced, of course, by the operation of the primary
allowance.
~6It might be argued that though the allowance in the first
instance goes to better off farmers it is passed on in the form
of wages to poorer members of the community and thus is
really redistributive, This argument seems too ingenious.
moreover percentage grants on the whole at a high
rate and on a relatively narrow range of services.
This structure of grants must have a tendency to
limit the effective freedom of action of Local
Authorities and their willingness to spend money
on the large number of possible items of local
expenditure for which grants are not available. It
must also involve the relevant Departments of the
Central Government in a good deal of supervisory,
inspecting and approving activity. Finally--but of
great importanceJthe lack of any system of redis-
tributive grants must tend to penalise those citizens
living in the poorer parts o3 the State.
IV. PATTERNS OF REVENUE AND
EXPENDITURE
Tables 14 to 20 which are placed at the end of
this section illustrate the income and expenditure
position of the various Local Authorities37 The
following are some of the key points which seem to
emerge from the statistics.
Average expenditure per head in the four County
Boroughs was £21"4 per capita with a range of
£21.6 in Dublin to £18.5 in Waterford. As regards
the counties (including the Urban Districts) the
average per capita expenditure was £17.6 with a
range of £22.3 in Waterford to £13.3 in Mayo2s.
Thus, expenditure per head in the County Boroughs
was higher than expenditure in the counties. But
a more significant point is the wide difference
existing between the counties. On a per capita
expenditure basis the top five counties from an
expenditure point of view were Waterford £22.3,
Long ford £2o.7, Westmeath £2o.4, South
Tipperary £19.5 and Roscommon £i9’.4. The
bottom five were Mayo £13.3, Kerry £14.8, Donegal
£15.1
, 
Wexford £15.6 and Sligo £16.4. These are
very substantial differences. In Mayo, for example,
if her expenditure per head had been up to the
average expenditure per head of £i7.6--let alone
the level of some of the freer spending counties--
this would have added nearly half a million pounds
to, l/her total expenditure and increased it by some
3° per cent.
Table 15 showing the per capita expenditure on
a variety of different services suggests that low
SVThough a great deal of statistical material is included,
the tables are by no means exhaustive. In particular an attemipt
has been made to avoid repetition by not always repeating in
precisely the same form tables for counties inclusive and
exclusive of the Urban Districts---even though, ideally,
this should be done.
ZSThese latter (county) figures are taken from column 5
of Table 14. They refer therefore to averages with respect
to the combined total of the County Councils and the Urban
District Councils.
27
aggregate figures carry with them below average
per capita performance in most types of expenditure,
though the association is by no means complete.
It is considered that statistics of per capita
expenditure may be taken as indicating in a very
broad way the level of service being obtained by
the inhabitants of an area ; a high per capita figure
indicating a better provision of services than a low
per capita figure. It is appreciated that many
objections can be made to this approach; rates of
wages vary from area to area ; productivity varies ;
and costs of raw materials Vary. So, too, do the
needs of areas: some Authorities, for example,
have many more miles of road per person to maintain
or have more residents needing re-housing than
others.
It is hoped eventually to build up real indicators
of the level of services in the different parts of the
State and this will be a much better way of doing
the job than looking at statistics of per capita
expenditure. Nevertheless with all their imper-
fections it is considered that the per capita figures
do indicate the right orders of magnitude.
What is being suggested on the basis of the
per capita expenditure figures deployed in Tables
14 and x5 is, therefore, that the level of services
provided by the different LoCal Authorities varies
across the State.
If we examine the income side the position is not
too dissimilar. Rate income of County Councils
averaged (Table I6) £6.8 per capita with a range
from Waterford with £io.9 per capita, Westmeath
with £9"3 and Meath with £9.o on the one hand to
Donegalwith £5.i, Kerry £5.o, Leitrim £4"9 and
Mayo £4.2. Examining the figures in Tables i4,
I6 and 17 it would seem that in very broad terms
expenditure per head and rate income per head
move together.
This poses an extremely important question.
If those counties which have relatively lowper capita
expenditures and rate incomes have chosen to tax
themselves relatively lightlyand have a relatively low
level of expenditure then this is no doubt interesting
but if we believe in a considerable degree of local
autonomy and freedom there is little more to be
said. If the elected representati~ces 0f the people
have chosen to have a relati~cely low level of public
consumption and a relatively high level of private
consumption this is a matter for the electors in the
relevant areas and for no one else.
Another possibility, however, is that those areas
with low expenditures and low rate incomes are
poor areas. In such circumstances it could be that
the level of taxation which exists in these areas is
high relatively to the level of income or wealth in
28
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the area but that nevertheless because of their
poverty the level of rate income per head and
expenditure per head is low. It~. is extremely
important to know whether this is or is not the case.
At the moment the information available with
respect to the income and w.ealth position of the
individual counties is not sufficient to allow a firm
opinion to be formed on the matter.29 However,
the evidence that is available tends to suggest that
this latter possibility is probably correct.
In the first place levels of rate poundage tend
to be high in those areas where the level of per
capita expenditure is low which indicates, at any
rate to some extent, that the Councils are trying to
provide a reasonably high level of service. It will
be clear from Table I6 that the counties with the
highest rate poundages were Kerry with 5i/-,
Donegal with 48/3d,, Galway with 47/4d, Longford
with 46/-and Mayo with 45/-. On the other hand
the counties with the lowest rate poundages were
Meath with 25/-
, 
Monaghan with :33/-, South
Tipperary with 33/4d., Wexford:with 32/- and
Kilkenny with 3I/8d. It may be noted that three
of the five counties with the lowest ,per capita
expenditures are three of the counties with the
highest rate poundages and that four 0f the five
counties with the lowest rate poundages have
per capita expenditures above the average.
This evidence is, of course, not conclusive for
in view of the state of the valuation system it is
not certain that valuations in,the various c0unti~
reflect from a relative point of view the ,income/
wealth position. It follows that one cannot really
directly compare the rate poundages and usethem
as evidence of the relative burden of taxation.
However, there is some interest "in comparing
the valuation position and some relevant: statistics
are set out in Tables i6 and t7. In the counties
as is indicated in Table i6 average per capita
valuation was £5 "4. The countieswith the highest
.per capita valuations were Meath with £9.8;
Waterford with £7"2, South Tipperary with £7’8
and Westmeath with £7"4. At the bottom Were
Mayo with £3 "3, Donegal with £3"~ and KeriT with
£3"3. If we accept the average valuation figures for
the counties as an indicator of their relative income/
wealth position then it would seem that "the low
expenditures and rate income position of some of
the counties is a reflection of their poverty.
Another comparison which emphasises this
particular point is made in the final column of Table
17. Average expenditure as a percentage of rateable
value is about 34° per cent. The three counties
*°A study which, it is hoped, will throw light on this problem
is being undertaken at the Institute,
l
with the lowest expenditure per capita figures have
high expenditure to rateable value ratios, namely,
Kerry, Mayo and Donegal. Sligo and Galway, too,
which have low per capita expenditures and high
rate poundages have high ratios of expenditure to
rateable value. All this is suggestive that they are
holding back their expenditures because of lack
of resources rather than because of deliberate
desire. At the other extreme a good number of
the higher per capita expenditure and low rate
poundage counties have a below average ratio of
expenditure to rateable value.
A similar picture is shown by comparing columns
five and six of Table 17. To a substantial extent
those counties that have below average per capita
income figures have above average ratios of income
to rateable value.
It is interesting to note the distribution of State
grants. In Table 18 the percentage distribution of
the agricultural grant is shown by counties and
also the percentage distribution of a number of
other related statistics. It is particularly interesting
to examine :the Table with respect to Mayo and
Donegal--the two counties with the lowest per
capita expenditure and rateable values. With
respect to the-value indicators--rate income,
expenditure alid valuations--and to the distribution
of acreages Mayo and Donegal get a higher
proportion of" the Agricultural Grant than that
to which--on that count--they are "entitled ". On
the other hand, with respect to population and
labour emp!oyed in Agriculture they get a lower
percentage.    ~ .
Table 19 ~a) shows the per capita distribution of
the Agricultural Grant. It will be noted that our
two " low expenditure " counties get below average
per capita support from the Grant.
Tables 19 arid 20 show the distribution of
grants as a whole to the Local Authorities. No very
clear positive picture emerges from the statistics
but the negative conclusion--that there is no real
evidence to show greater State support for the
counties which are probably poorer--seems to be clear.
Of the five County Councils with the lowest
rateable values per head, Donegal, Mayo, Kerry,
Galway and Leitrim(Table I6), three of them,
Donegal, Mayo and Kerry, receive per capita grants
less than the average and the other two more than
the average (Table i9 (a)). Of the five counties
with the highest per capita rateable values, Meath,
SoutK3Tipperary, Waterford, Westmeath and Kil-
kenny (Table I6), all receive per capita grants
greater than the average (Table 19 (a)).
A similar conclusion is suggested by looking at
the figures of expenditure in relation to grants.
We noted earlier that the five counties with the
lowest per capita expenditure figures (Table 14)
were Mayo, Donegal, Kerry, Wexford and Sligo.
Four of these received less than average per capita
Grants (Table 20). On the other hand of the five
counties with the highest per capita expenditures,
Waterford, Longford, Westmeath, South Tipperary
and Roscommon, four of them received grants
greater than the per capita average--Longford,
Waterford, Westmeath and Roscommon.
There is a much " better" association between
grants with respect torate income in the sense that
the ratio tends to be bigger the lower the per capita
rate income. (See Tables 19 (a), 19 (b) and 20.)
This appearance of a redistributive effect is, however,
somewhat spurious, for two reasons. In the first
place since levels of per capita expenditures are
different it is doubtful what real meaning can be
given to the association. If County A receives a
higher proportional State grant with respect to her
level of expenditure than B but even with this
assistance is still spending much less per capita than
B and receiving less per capita by way of State
Grants it seems very doubtful if it is legitimate to
argue that the State is helping A more than B.
The second reason is that the burden of.local
taxation is heavier with respect to rateable values
in those areas which have a high ratio of grants to
total expenditure.
~l~/Clearly these (poorer) Authorities are being
helped to some extent. :They are better off than
they would be if the total money available for
grants was allocated simply in proportion to
expenditure. (We have already seen that there is
an-element of redistribution with the Agricultural
Grant.) Nevertheless in the light of the two points
made above it seems doubtful if the ’fact’ that
Authorities with low rate income per capita figures
have a higher proportion of their expenditure
financed by grants should be taken as implying~that
the Grant system is effectively distributive, i.e.,
serves to even out differences in the wealth of the
various areas so as. to enable comparable services
to be provided at a similar local tax burden.
Though the basic material is hardly strong
enough to support any very firm conclusions8° it is
believed the position could be put as follows :--
I. The level of Local Government services
provided varies widely across the State.
3°This needs to be emphasised particularly with respect
to (2), (4) and (5) below. Until the work referred to in footnote
29 has been done statements referring to the relative wealth
of counties, and therefore to their taxation burden and to
whether or not grants go to the counties that need the most
must be treated with extreme caution.
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2. The burden of local taxation also varies
considerably across the State when looked
at in connection with rateable value.
3. There seems to be some evidence that the
burden of local taxation was often higher
in those areas where the level of services
was lower.
4. As measured by per capita rateable values ’the
level of wealth varied considerably in the
State from one Local Authority to another.
5. There is no evidence that the grants from the
central Government particularly help the
poorer areas more than the richer areas.
TAmm x4 : LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE "I959/6o.
County Councils
County Councils and U.D.C’.s County Boroughs.¯
County
Total Per Capita: Tota( Per Capita :’ Total ! Per.’Capita,
/ £ooo £ ~ ~OOO ’: £ £
I. Carlow : ... ;.. 5°9"5 I9"9 580.5 17.4
2. Cavan . .... 1,o31"5 19.3~ 1,o59’5 18.7
3. Clare .1#43"8 19"1 1,3o4"2 17"7
4. COrk ... 4,282"1 i9.3 4,446 ’3 17.6 1,65i,’5 21 "2
5. Donegal ...... 1;669"5 15"9 1,722"5 i5;i
6. Dublin ...... 2,551"2 :19.2 f 3,236"8 17"9 1,548 2I "6
7. Galway ...... 2,394"7 19"6 2,5o3"4 16.7
8. Kerry ........ 1,599"3 I6’7 1,726"5 14.8
9- Kildare ¯ "’" I,O82"3 19.2 1,147"2 17.8
IO. Kilkenny ...... I,O85"3 21 "I 1,183"2 I9"I
I I..Laoighis ..... 824.1 18.3 824"I ¯18.3
12. Leitrim ...... 610"0 18"2 6io.o 18"2
13. Limerick . .. 1,409.8 17;1 1,409’8 17"1 1;o67"3 2I’I
14. Longford ...... 602"5 22’2 631"9 20’7
15. Louth ...... 858"9 28"2
~ 1,263’2 18.8
16. Mayo . ..... 1,55I’I 14"3 L 1,642.4 13"3
x7. Meath ......... 1,196"9 2o.8 1,261.5 19"4
18. Monaghan ... ¯846.7 23"O 909"6 19.3
19. Offaly ... 828 "7 19"7 890 "7 17"3
20. Roscommon ... I,I46"5 19"4 1,146.5 19"4
21. Sligo ........ 782.1 19’4 878.8 16.4
22. Tipperary N.R .... 887.z ¯ 21.5 " 965.8 18!o
23. Tipperary S.R .... 1,173"o 24.8 ’ , 1,367.4 i9.5
24. Waterford ¯ ... 926~6 24 "4 964.0 22"3 :; 518.7 i8-5
25. Westmeath ... 994"7 23"1 1,o75 "2 20"4
26. Wexford ; ..... 1,139"7 I8"I 1,3o2"5 lS.6
27. Wicklbw . ..... 929 "3 24"3 I,I08"I 19"o " "’7"
All Authorities. ...... 34,I57’2 I9"4 37,26I "4 I7"6 14,785’7 21"4
Sonrces : ReturmofLoccd Taxation for year ended 3I/3/I960. Pr. 5859.
Prdiminary Report on 196I Census. Pr. 6134.
NOTES ON TABLE i4
I. The per capita figures have been obtained by dividing the x959/6o expenditure figures by the April x96i Census results.
Tliis introduces an overall upward bias in the statistics as the population of the State was higher in I959/6o than in I96L Noris the bias the same for all areas for in some Counties the population was falling more rapidly than in others ; indeed in some
Local Authority areas notably County Dublin and some of the Urban Districts the population probably increased between I96O
and 1961. However, the errors are not likely to be large and are certainly not important with respect to the sort of comparison
we are making.
a. The Urban Districts made available in x959/6o some £I "2 million to the County Councils as a contribution towards
County Council expenditures. In arriving at the combined totals in the Table the transfers have been eliminated to avoid double
counting~
3. In this Table and in the ones that follow totals may not add up exactly owing to rounding.
3°
TABLE 15 : EXPENDITURE .PER HEAD ON VARIOUS SI~RVICES BY COUNTIES.
(County Councils and Urban District Councils.).
General Purposes,
County Roads Health Housing Mental : Sanitary~- Public Assistance
Hospitals Services and miscel.
x. Carlow ...... 3"8 4"9 3"4 1.6 I’2 2"5
2. Cavan ...... 6.3 5"5 1"7 2"0 0"8 2’53. Clare ...... 5"4 5"Z I"7 2"3 0"7 -- 2’4
4. Cork
¯
... 5"7 4’9 2"5 I’O !’2 2’2
5. Donegal ...... 5"5 4"0 1"5 i.4" I’O I"76. Dublifi ...... 2"9 3.8 6"0 0"6 2"3 2’3
7. Galway ...... 5"1 5"4 I"4 2"3 0"9 2"28. Kerry ....... 4"3 4’5 I’6 I"7 0"7 2"I
9. Kildare ......
IO. Kilkenny ’
4"9 4"8 2"9 I’I" I"4 2"7
... 5"2 5"5 2’6 2"I , 0"8 2"9I i. La0ighis .... :. 6"0 5"4 I’8 1"3 I’O 2"8
xz. Leitrim ..: ... 8"0 4"I 0"8 2"3 O"5 2"413. Limerick ...... 4"8 5"4 2"0 1"4 0"9 2"514. Longford ... 5"5 5"8 2"7 I"9 I"5 3"2I5. Louth ~ ..: ..... 3"7 5"0 3"7 I"5 I’6
16. Mayo ....... 3"34"3 4"I I’O I’6 0"5 I’8
17. Meath ....... 5"8
18. Monaghan 5"9
2"9 I’I 0"7
"...
2’9
6"6 6"0 I"7 I’8 0"5 2"719. Offaly ....... 4"7 4"9 2"5 I"3 0"9 3"020. Roscommon    ... 6"6 5;’0 I"5 2"9 0"7 2"721. Sligo ~ ...... 5"0 4"5 1"6 2"I o’ff 2".5
22. Tippera~y N.R .... 5"3 5"0 2"3 I"3 0"9 3"2
23. Tipperary S.R .... 5’7 2"6 I"5 0"824. Waterfo~d ¯ 5
.0
... 6.5
3"96.3 2"5 2"0
25. Westme~th
i "4 3’6
... 5"4 6-I , 2*9 1"6 I’226. Wexford ...... 3"34"5 4"3 I"9 I"6 0"7 2"5
27. Wicklo~ ...... 5"4 5:0 3"0 1"5 I"3 2"9
Totai .:i..’... ] 5.i 4"9 2"4 I’5 I’I . 2"5
,
Sources : as in Table 14.
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¢TxmJ~ x6:, RATE INCOME ETC. OF COUNTY COUNCILS x959/6o.
( C.
Rateable: Rate "’ Rate Agricultural
Value Income Poundage i Grant Income ~
County
Total Per Capita: Total ’ Per Capita~ ¯ shs. in Total 5 !Per Cap~tw
£o0o £~ £0o0 £, £, 000 ~"
1. Carlow .... 166.7 6"51 196"4 7"67 33/6"0(’ 82"6 3 ’23
2. Cavan ... 284.i 5"32 317"o 5"94 39/o’o 23o"3 4"31
3. Clare ... 339"7 5"2I 422 "7 6-48 39/8"9 243"8 3 "74
4. Cork" ... 1,!77"9 5 "3° 1,659"o 7"47 4o/8"8 659"4 2"97
5" Donegal ... 338:2 3"2I 531"3 5’°5 48/3.o 268 "8 2.56
6, Dublin ... 7o5"1 5"3° 934"6 7"°3 34/0"0 110"6’ :83
7. Galway ... 497"9 4.08 676.8 5"54 47/4"5 469;1. 3 "84
8, Kerry ... 316.6 3’3° 483"o 5"°3 51,[o’5 288.8 ¯3:0I
9. Kildare ... 332"8 5"89 434"8 7"7° 35/o’o 188.3 3 ’33
lO. Kilkenny ... 356"3 6.91 383 "4 7"44 31/8’6 179"2 . : "3"@
i1. Laoighis 148.7.:. 26o.6 5 "78 31’5.9 7.oo 35/1"7 .... l 3:3°
12. Leitrim ... 147.8 4"41 164"o 4"9° 4o/8"o. 134"5 :~,4.01
13. Limerick 6.6o 249.0 ¯ 3"02 ,..: 491’1 5 ’95 544"6 33Io’o
14. Longford ... I50"3 5"55 219"o 8"o8 46/0"o 128.9 ~:4.76 ¯
x5. Louth~ ... 2OO’I 6.56 263 .8 8.65 36/0"5 I0O’I 3’28 "
16. Mayo ...... 356"7 3"28 454’1 , 4"17 45/o’o " 323 "3 2"97
17. Meath 56I "5 9 "77 519"3 9"°3 25/8"7 194.5 3 "38
18. Monaghan ... 251"2 6.81 231 "6 6.28 33/9"0 I7I "I ’:~4~64
4:3Ir "19. Offaly ... 24o.o 5.7o 300"3 7"I3 37/9"0 ¯ i49.9 3"56
2o. Roscommon 322"0 5’44 374’6 6"33 39/8"5 255"o
21. Sligo ...... 204"0 5 "o5 218.1 5 "4° 38/2"o 162’5 "=4:02 -
22. Tipperary N.R. 267 "4 6.49 334"1 8’11 38/4"0 171 "4 "4"16
23. Tipp~rary S.R. 37o.o 7"81 433"8 9"15 33/4"2 185.6 3’92 "
24. Waterford ... 274.6 7"23 413"3 io.88 4o/9"o 144"8 3’8i ¯
25. Westme~th ... 319"5 7"41 403.1 9’35 35/0.’0 .153.1 3’55
26. Wexford ... 37o’9 5"89 388.8 6.17 32/9"0 ¯ :’ 2o8.4 3.31
27. Wicklow ... 256"7 6.7o 329 "4 8.6o 35/8.4, , 128.5 3’36
Total ... 9,56o’9 5 ’42 11,947"1 6"77 5,736"5 3’25
Sources : AS in Table I4.
NOTES ON TABLE x6 ,.
z. Per capita figures have been derived as in Table x4.
2. Rate In’come includes Increases in Rents of small Dwellings amounting in total to just over a quarter of a million pounds.
3. Agricultural Grant Income includes the~ contributions paid by the State in respect of property which became it is
used by the State is exempt from Rates. This amounted to about £z86,ooo. ~ ,
- ,.,
TABLE 17 : RATE INCOME AND EXPENDITURE WITH RESPECT TO RATEABLE VALUE BY COUNTIES. 195916o.
(Aggregate of County and Urban District Councils.)
Rate plus Agricultural
Rateable Value Grant Income Total
County Expenditure
Total Per Capita Total : Per Capita As % of, As % of
f Rateable Rateable
£000 000 £ Value Value
1. Carlow ...... 188.1 5"7 324"5 9"7 172"5 308.6
2. Cavan ...... 295 "3 5"2 565 "8 IO’O 191.6 " 358"8
3. Clare ...... 365 "5 5"0 716"3 9"7 196.o 356"8
4. Cork ....... 1,283"8 5"1 2,491 ’o 9"9 194"o 346"3
5. Donegal ...... 368"7 3"2 861.1 7.6 233 "6 467"2
6. Dublin ...... 999"3 5"5 1,535"9 8"5 153"7 323 "9
7. Galway ...... 606.8 4"1 1,383"9 9"2 228.1 412.6
8. Kerry ...... 377 "4 3"2 9°1"5 7"7 238"9 457"5
9. Kildare ...... 360"4 5"6 667"9 lO-4 185"3 318"3 ,
lO. Kilkenny ... ... 388"5 6"3 63o.2 10"2 162"2 3o4"5
xi. Laoighis ...... 260.6 5"8 464"6 10"3 178"3 316.2
12. Leitrim ...... 147"8 4"4 298"5 8"9 202"0 412"7
13. Limerick ; ..... 491"1 6"0 793.6 9"6 161.6 287.1
14. Longford ... 162.1 5"3 372 "2 I2"2 229.6 389-8
15. Louth ...... 32o’6 4"8 602"5 9"0 187.9 394"1
16. Mayo ...... 398"3 3"2 864.8 7"0 217.1 412"3
17. Meath ~ . ..... 585 "5 9.0 75i’8 II’6 128.4 215"5
18. Monaghan     ... 287"1 6.1 460"9 9.8 160"5 316.8
19. Offaly ...... 271 "2 5"3 5o2.1 9"7 185’1 328"4
2o. Roscommon    ... 323"o 5’5 629.6 IO’6 194"9 355.’0
2i. Sligo ...... 245"o 4"6 461 "7 8~6~ 188"4 358"7
22. Tipperary N.R ....
¯ 306’3 5"7 573 "7 10"7 187"3 315"3
23. Tipperary S.R. 435 "9 6"2 734"2 IO"5 168"4 313’7
24. Waterford ... 291.o 6"7 589"5 13.7 202.6 331"3
25. Westmeath ... 346"0 6"6 614"7 II’6 177"7 31o.7 .
26. Wexford ...... 429 "2 5-2 715"8 8"6 166.8 303"5
27. Wicklow ....... 339 ’9 5"8 602.0 10"3 177"1 326"0
Total ...... lO,875"2 5.i 2o, I lO"2 , 9"5 184-9 342"6
f
Sources : As in Table I4.
NOTES ON TABLE 17
I. Per capita Statistics are derived as in Table 14.
2. Rate Ineorne includes the increase of rents of small dwellings ; and the Agricultural Grant Income includes the State
Grant paid in lieu of rates.
3. Statisticsarethe aggregate of County Councils and Urban D!strict Councils. I give on page 34the figures for the County
Boroughs of Cork, Dublin, Limerick and Waterford.
(Notes on Table 17 continued on nextpage.)
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(Note., on Table 17 continued from #reviom page.)
RATE INCOME, ETC., FOR COUNTY BOROUGHS, 1959/6o.
Rate Plus Agricultural
0 ty Rateable Value ’ Grafit Income Total ~." ": Rate ¯ Expenditure
Boroughs ¯ Per Capita I ¯ Per Capita As % of Poundage " As % of ¯
£ooo~
Rateable Rateable
" £ £000 £ Value Value ~-
Cork ...... 33I"4 4"3 794"3 I0"2 239"7 , 5ol6 : 498"3 -’
Dublin ... 3,I39"4 5"9 5,866"x II’O z86.8 39/4 :~ .367:8
Limerick xSo.i 3’6 4o5.o" 8.0 225 "4 48/9 592,6
Waterford zzo.z 3"9 242.8 8.6 220"5 46/zo 47z’z
Total , :.. r 3,761"z 5"4 7,309¯ z , xo-6 194"3 393" x
TABLE 18 : STATISTICS RELATING TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGRICULTURAL GRANT :
COUNTY COUNCILS.
1. Carl0w ...
2. Cavan ...
3; Clare ...
4. Cork ......
5. Donegal ": ...
6. Dublin ...
7. Galway
...
8. Kerry ...
9. Kildare ...
lO. Kilkenny ...
i t. Laoighis ...
12. Leitrim
13. Limerick
14. Longford ...
15. Louth ...
16 Mayo ...17.~ Meath
...
18. M0naghan ...
19. Offaly ...
20. Roscommon
2i. Sligo ...
22. Tipperary N.R.
23. Tipperary S.R.
24. Waterford ...
25. Westmeath ...
26. Wexford ...
27 Wicklow ...
% Distribution by Counties of:
Acreage Of Land ~ Agri-’ Males :, ’ Rate Total:
crops and, Valuations Population cultural Engaged in Income Expen- /
Pastures ? Grant Agriculture diture
1.6 1.9 1"5 I "4 z-5 1,6. " 1"5
3"4    i 3.2 3"0 , 4.0 ,3 "9 2"6 3"0
4.8
¯ 3"9 4"3 4"3 3"5 3.6
11-6 l ¯ 3"7I1"2 12"6 II"5 10"4 23~9 I2"5
3"6 3"2 6"o 4"7 6.3¯ 4"4 4"9
1’5 . 2"8 7"5 1"9 .I*9 - 7:8¯ 7"5
7"0 5’4 6.9 8"2 8’2 7"0
4.8 3"1 5"4 5"0 "9 ¯4*0 "-. 4"7
2"9 3"5 3"2 3’3 , 2"3 3.6 3.2,
3’8 - 3*24’I ¯2.9 3"1 3.o ! ¯ 3~2
2"8 :2"9 2:6 2"6 2.3 ¯ 2"6 2"4
2"3 1"6
¯i.9 ¯ 2.4 2"5 : 1.4 1"8
5.07’ 5.7 4"7 4.4 ¯ =-’ .....4-6 4"1
"
I "8 "" 1"8
¯
1"5 1"8¯ 2’3 1"9 1"8"
I"5 2"1 1"7 ¯ I "8 ¯ 1"6 ..... 2"2 2"6 :
5"0 3"7 6"2 5.6 8.2 3"8 4"5
4.6 6.9 : 3"3 3"4 3"4 4"3 3"5
2"4 2"9 2"1 3"0 2-7 1"9 2"5
3"0 2"8 : 2"4 2’4 2.5 2"4Z,.2"6
4"I 3.6 3"4 4"5 4"1 3"1 3"4
2"5 2"4 2"3 2"8 3.1 1"8" "~ 2.3{73t:3"1 2"3 3"0 1,71¯ 2"8 2"64"5 2"7 3.2 3"6 3"4
2"6, 3*0 2"2 2"5 2"0 3"5 2"Z
3"1 3"7 2"4 2"7 2"3 3"4 2"9
’4-’3 ’2 3"6 3"6 3"8 3"2 3 "3
2"2 2*5 2"2 2"2 1"7 2"8 2’71
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,~ources : As in Table x4 and the Statistical Abstract.
TABLE x9 (a): GRANTS TO COUNTY COUNCILS, 1959-6o.
Agricultural Grant ’Percentage Grants Total Grants
County
Amount Per Capita Amount Per Capita Amount Per Capita
£000 £ £000 £ £oo0 £
.-t..
1. Carlow ......... 82 3"2 171 6"7 254 9:9
2. Cavan ......... 225 4"2 396 7"4 626 11"7
3. Clare ......... 24° 3"7 544 8"3 788 12"1
4. Cork    ~ . ..... ... 637 2"9 1,549 7"o 2,209 9"9
5. Donegal ......... 262 2’5 762 7"2 1,03I 9.8
6. Dublin .......... IOO 0"7 614 4"6 725 5"4
7. Galway , ......... 456 3"7 897 7"3, 1,367 II’2
8. Kerry ., ........... 285 3"0 ¯ 636 6"6 925 9.6
9. Kildare f ......... 137 2"4 387 6"8 575 10"2
1o. Kilkenny ’ .......... 175 3"4 386 7"5 565 II’0
I i: Isaoighis ~ ...... ; 14o 3"1 290 6.4 .... 9"7
12. Leitrim ! .........
439
132 3"9 276 8.2~ 411 "-12.3
13. Limerick ~’ ......... 247 3"0 480 5’8 729 8.8
14. Longfofd ......... 126 4"6 202 7"4 331 12"2
15. Louth . ........ 1o0 3"3 309 IO’I 41o 13.4
16. Mayo ......... 323 3"0 673 6’2 996- 9-2
17. Meath ... 460 8’0 II’4
18. Monagi~an .........
194 3"4 654
¯ 168 4"5 302 8"2 473 12"8
19. Offaly i ...... :... 147 3"5 269 6-4 419 9"9
zo. R~e0mmpn ...... 252 4"3 388 6"5 643 lO.9
zi, Sligo    ; ......... 16o 4.0 , 340 8"4 502 12.4
~2. T~pperaryI N.R ....... 17o 4"1 303 7’3 474 11.5
z3. Tipperary S.R ........ 182 3.8 389 8"2 574 12"1
z4. Waterford ......... 138 3.6 36i 9"5 505 13 "3
zS. Westmeath ...... I48 3"4 320 7"4 473 II’0
~6. W exford ’ . ........ 208 3 "3 412 6’5 620 9.8
z7. Wicklow . ........ IiO 2"9 364 9"5 493 12"9
Total ........ :;.. ,..
...... 5,5453"1 12,48o 7"1 18,21I 10"3
Source, : As for Table 14.
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TABLE x9 (b): GRANTS TO COUNTY COUNCILS, I959/’6o.
% Distribution of ’Total Grants as % of
County
Total ¯Rate Rateable
Grants Population ExPenditure Income: Value "
r
1. Carlow ...... 1"4. io5 5° 130 ¯ 152
2. Cavan ... 3"4 3"o 61. .- I97 22O
3. Clare ......... 4"3 .... 3"7 63 186, 232¯
4. Cork ....... ... I2"I t3 12"6 52 . . I33 187 :
5. Donegal ......... 5"7 T 6’0 62 ~ . ,. I94 305
6. Dublin ... ... 4"0
¯ 7:5 28 78 103 .
7. Galway ..... .    ... 7’5 6.9 57 202 275
8. Kerry ......... 5"1 5"4 58 191 291
9. Kildare ......... 3"1 3.2 53L 132 173
to. Kilkenny ......... 3"1 2.9 52 147¯ 159
i i. Laoighis ......... 2"4 2.6 53 168 139
~2. Leitrim ......... 2"2 1.9 67 250 278
I3. Limerick ......... 4"0 4"7 52 134 148
14. Longford ..... :~ ... I’8 1"*5 55 I5I . ’ 22I
t5. Louth ......... 2’2 I"7 48 155 205
i6. Mayo .......... 5"5 6"2 64 2!9 ¯ 279
17.~ Meath ......... 3.6 3’3 54 126 117 ¯
18. Monaghan ........ 2"1 56 2o4 188
19. Offaly ......... 2"3 2"4 5o~ 140    , 175
2o. Roscommon ... ... 3"5 3"4 56 171 2OO
21. Sligo ...... ..... z’7 ~’3 64 230 246.
22. Tipperary N.R ....... 2:6 2"3 53 142 177
23. Tipperary S.R ....... 3"1 2"7 49 132 155
24, Waterford . ..... 2"8 2"2 54 122 184
25. Westmeath ...... 2"6 2’4 47 117 148
26. Wexford . ........ 3’4 3"6 54 !59 167
27. Wicklow ......... 2"7 2"2 53 150-. 193
)
Total .... . .... IOO IO0 53 152 19o
Sources : As in Table ~4.
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TABLE 20 : GRANTS TO COUNTY AND URBAN DISTRICT COUNCILS, I959-6o.
Total Grants Grants as % of
County
Amount Per Capita Expenditure Rateable Value
£000 £
x. Carlow ............ 274 8.3 47
2. Cavan ............ I45"7630 II’I 59 213"53. Clare ............ 802 lO.8 61 219"7
4. Cork ............ 2,242 8.9 5° 162.o
5. Donegal ............ ¯ i,o4o 9"1 60 281.8
6. Dublin ............ 844 4"7 26
¯ 84"5
7. Galway ............ 1,420 9"5 57
8. Kerry ............ 233 "9"96o 8"2 56 254’6
9. Kildare ............ 59° 9"2 5 I 163;9lO. Kilkenny ............ 589 9"5 5° 15I’8
11. Laoighis .......... .. 439 9"7 53 i68.2
1L Leitrim ............ 4II I2’3 67 ’277"7
13. Limerick ............ 729 8.8 52 148"5
14. Longford ......... 336 II’O 53 2o7 "4
15. Louth ............. 494 7"3 39 153.916. Mayo ............ 1,o16 8"2 62 255"3 .:-~-.
17. Meath    . ......... 668 IO"3 53 i14.218. Monaghan ......... 485 lO.3 53 ¯ ’i~3.2
19. Offaly ............ 436 8.5 49 x6o.92o. Roscommon ......... 643 10’9 56 199"1
2i. Sligo ............ 524 9"8 6o 213"922. Tipperary N.R .......... 497 9"2 5:1 162"4
23. Tipperary S.R .......... 614 8"7 45 14o-8
24. Waterford ...
. ......... 515 1I"9 53 177"o.
25. Westmeath ......... 492 9"3 46 142.2
26. Wexford ............ 657 7"9 5° 153"1
27. Wicklow ............ 53° 9"1 48 155:9
Total ......... 18,877 8.9 51 173.6
Sources : As in Table 14.
NOTES ON TABLE 20
The statistics in the Table relate to total grants received by County Councils and Urban District Councils. Some statistics
for the four County Boroughs for 1959/6o are given below.
Total Grants
County Borough Grants as % of
Amount Per Capita’ Expenditure
£
Rateable Value
£ooo !.
Cork ......... 498 6.4 30.2 . 15o.4
Dublin ...... 3,000 5"6 26.o 95"6
Limerick ...... 274 5"4 25"7 i52.o
Waterford ...... z47 5"2 28’3 ] 133"5
Total ... 3,919 5"7 26"5 1o4.2
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V. CONCLUDING NOTE the different’ types of Authority was noted (pp.
: ..... 20-21). The likely effects of the lack of any proper
(a) SummalD" form of redistributive or general grants were pointed
After indicating the many aspects of the financial: Out (P~ 27)" The Agricultural Grant was looked
position of Local Authorities that would not be at in some detail and it was suggested :-
looked at in this Preliminary Survey (p. 1) and
stressing the large and growing sums ofmoney being
spent by Local Authorities (pp. 1-3) certain general
arguments relating to Local Authority finance were
considered and the following points were made :--
(a) That Local Authorities in Ireland are much
more than "executive agencies" of the
Central Government (pp. 3-5).
(b) Thai there were certain principles which
could be applied so as to help assess which of
the public services should be operated by,
: Local Authorities (pp. 5-7,).
(c) That it was desirable that the Local
Authorities should be financed both from
resoureeslunder their own control and from
Central Government Grants (pp. 7-9).
(d) Three main types of grant were distinguished
and it was argued that there was a need in
Ireland for all three types-Tpercentage, re-
distributive and general grants (pp. 9-11).
The next sections of the Paper were concerned
with the revenue of Local Authorities. After
discussing the main trends during recent years
(pp. 11-13) there was a fairly detailed discussion
ofthe two main forms of revenue---Rates and Grants.
On rates it was suggested :m
(a) That the present system of Valuation for
rating is out of date arm inadequate (pp.
13"15).     ,,
(b) That in certain instances the Local Rate is an
inequitable tax in the sense that it can so
affect the overall tax burden as to bring about
a conflict with the acceptable principle that
taxes should be levied in accordance with
abilityto pay (PP. 15-18).
(c) That though there was a place for the Local
Rate in the overall tax system it should not--
because of the various imperfections associated
with it--be allowed tobecome too important
a revenue raiser (pp. 18-19).
In examining the system of State support it
was pointed out that percentage grants dominate
the scene (p. 19) and their importance with
respect to the expenditure On various services by
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(a) That the Primary AHowance within a given
Authority’s area has some redistributive
effect (pp. 21-22).
(b) That there were four factors affecting the
allocation of the Primary Allowance as
between counties and that very often these
factors would be in Conflict with each other
(pp. 23-26).
(c) That the Employment Allowance had little
redistributive effect (pp. 26-27).
In the last main part of the Paper a good number
of statistics were deployed re!atingto the Revenue
and Expenditure Patterns of Local ’Authorities
and it was suggested that the following conclusions
seemed to emerge :m
(a) That the level of seivices provided varied
,considerably from one Authority to another.
(b) That the burden of local: taxation also seemed
to vary from one Authority to another.
(c) ThaV a high level Of services seemed to be
associated with a relati,~ely low burden of
taxation and vice versa.
(d) That as measured by rateable Values the level
of wealth varied considerably from 0neLocal
Authority area to another.    , -
(e) That it did not Seem-that-State support
particularly helped the poorer counties more
than the better-off ones. - .... -
(b) Conclusions
Most of the conclusions of the Paper are clearly
mentioned in the Summary above. In thisfinal
Section it is desired to refer to two general matters.
A main conclusion of the work underlying this
Preliminary Survey is the need for a greaf:deal more
research--even on the topics cove~ed by the paper
--before it is possible-to establish a clear view of the
main problems and possible solutions. Iffthe
Paper specific reference has been made t01 the
following gaps in our knowledge :~
(a) The costs of operating services by different
types ofpubiic authority (pp. 5-7). ....
(b) The rate and.taxation burdefi on individuals in
different income ranges, Occupations and
parts of the State (pp. i8-’i9).
(c) The need for estimates of the aggregate and
per capita income and wealth position of the
various Local Authorities (p. 27).
At- the present time the Institute is trying to
help meet this lack of knowledge by concentrating
its attention on (b) and (c) of the items listed above.
Finally it is desired to emphasise the broad
implication of some of the points made separately
in the Paper and recorded in the Summary. In
total it is believed that the points made in this
Preliminary Survey with respect to Rates and Grants
establish the need for a re-consideration of the way
in which Local Authorities should be financed,
particularly when it seems likely that Local Authority
Expenditure will continue to rise.
Important aspects of the Local Government
Finance system should be much clearer when the
research mentioned above is completed but even
now at least two issues seem to invite discussion.
First, should expenditure levels and local tax levels
be reasonably equal throughout the State ? ArM
if the answer is in the affirmative what sort of
equalisation grant structure (or alternative remedy)
should be introduced ? It also seems timely that
there should be discussion of the case for a general
grantmpossibly offset by~ a reduction in the various
percentage grants--and of the purpose in detail
the Agricultural Grant is supposed to serve. The
second issue concerns the rating system, Is it
equitable to raise the large sums of money that are
now being raised through local rates when the basis
of the tax is out of date and when there are so many
imperfections connected ~vith it ?
APPENDIX
I. As pointed out in the text the basic statistics
that are available, at the moment, are not sufficient
to enable many statements to be made concerning
the impact of rates. Two publications do, however,
provide some data that can be used as illustrative
material: The Reports of the National Farm
Survey1 and the Report of the Household Budget
Inquiry, i951/2.3
2. National Farm Survey. Full details as to how
the sample of farms included in The Survey was
determined, the method of classification, and the
principles lying behind the definitions usecl for
farm revenue
, 
costs and income can be found in the
Reports. Table A below shows in summary form
the relation between rates and family income with
respect to the various sizes and types of farms
included in the Survey. As stated above these
figures should be regarded as illustrative only.
In particular it shouldbe remembered that they
relate only to averages and clearly there will be some
farms upon which the burden of rates falls much
more severely and some much more lightly than is
indicated in the Table.
XAll published as Supplements to the Irish Trade ffournal
and Statistical Bulletin. In this Appendix material from the
summary publication has been used ; National Farm Survey
I955156--I957/58: Financial Results for Farms included
Throughout the Three Years, Supplement to the December
I959 issue of the Irish Trade ffournal.
2Household Budget Inquiry, x951-52. Compiled by the
Central Statistical Office pr. 2520, 1954. This source was
u¯sed by Reason in the Paper cited in footnote x3 in the main
body of the paper.
TtmL~ A: RATES AS % OF FARM INCOME: AVERAGE OF i955/56-x957/58.
Item
Dairyhzg : No Cash Crops
Number of Farms in Survey ...
Family income ...... ...
Rates as % of
(a) Family Income ......
(b) Cash Income ......
Dairying : With Cash Crops
Number ’of Farms’ in Survey ...
Family Income .........
Rates as % of
(a) Family Income ......
,:~ (b) Cash Income ......
Size of Farm
15-3o Acres 3o-5° Acres 5O-lOO Acres ioo--2oo, Acres
43 55 73 29
£37° £480 £694 £919
3.2 3"7 4"7 7"2
4"4 4.8 5"7 8.6
49 74 55
£642 £88i £I,367
4"4 5.8 8.3
5.i 6.6 9"2
39
Item
Mixed Crops
Number of Farms in Survey ...
Family Income ...........
Rates as % of
(a) Family Income ......
(b) Cash Income ......
Cattle :. Mixed
Number of Farms in Survey ...
~Family Income .........
Rates as % of
(a) Family Income ......
(b) Cash Income ......
Subs/sta~e ’
Number of Farms in Survey ...
Family Income .........
Rates as ~/o of
(a) Family Income ......
(b) Cash Income ......
15-3o Acres
43
£4°9
3"4
4’7
71
£36o
3"9
5"9
62
£186
4"8
9"7
Size of Farm
3o-5° Acres
39
£579
3"7
4"7
85
£438
5"0
7"1
31
£I9o
6.8
i3.8
5O-lOO Acres 1OO--200 Acres
51
£8o3
4"9
5.8
33
£I,X63
61
£576
6-6
8.6
7"9
9"1
27
£916
12"2
14"3
5-15 Acre Farms
60
£136
"I’
12"7
NOTES ON TABLE A
*. Source : National Farm Suroey. 1955/6-I957/8, Supplement to Irish Trade aYournal, December 1959. Detailed
definitions, etc. will be found therein.
2. Family Income is taken inclusive of Rates.
3. The difference between Family Income and Cash Income represents the value (at ex-farm prices) of the agricultural
production consumed by the Farm Family.
3. Two points may be made with respect to the
Table. First, that with respect to farmers rates
seem to be a progressive tax. The second point is to
emphasise the very heavy burden of rates as a
percentage of incomes on the larger farms. It will
be noted that for the hundred to two hundred acre
size group the burden of rates with respect to total
income varies from 7.2 per cent. to i2.2 per cent. and
with respect to cash income from 8.6 per cent. to
i4.3 per cent. This is a very substantial burden.3
4. The statistics in Table A refer to the period
1955/56 to I957/8. Comparing this period with
i959/6o rates had increased by some 13 per cent.in
the Counties whereas farm income had remained
’It is appreciated that this is the burden of one tax only
and that what is important is the overall burden of taxation.
It is also appreciated that at the higher incomes farmers may
benefit in comparison with other members of the community
with similar incomes in that due to the way in which the Income
Tax is administered with respect to farmers they are to all
extent and purposes relieved of such liability.
4°
constant. Thus the burden of rates with respect to
income had increased. For example, in connection
with " cattle : mixed farms " the burden of rates
instead of being i2.2 per cent. With respect to
family income and i4-3 per cent. with respectto
cash income would have become about 14 per cent.
with respect to family income and 16 per cent. with
respect to cash income.
5. Household Budget Inquiry. In i951/52 an
extensive inquiry was carried out into the ex-
penditure pattern of households in non-rural
Ireland. As part of this work householders were
asked to state itheir expenditures on rents (inclusive
or rates) in the case of tenants and their expenditure
on rates if they were owner occupiers. Out of the
great mass of statistical information made available
in the official Report of this investigation the
following Table has been constructed which
indicates the burden of rates in relation to total
expenditure by households classified by size and
byper capita incomes. Again, it must be emphasised
that this material should be regarded as purely
illustrative. 4
7. Between 1951/52 and 1959/6o total personal
expenditure went up by about 38 per cent. and total
rate payments went up by about 67 per cent. It is
probable, therefore, that on average all the rate
TABLE B: RATES AS % OF EXPENDITURE: OWNER OCCUPIERS ONLY: I9SI[52.
Size of Household
One or two persons ......
Weekly Expenditure (shillings)
Three or four persons ...
Weekly Expenditure (shillings)
Five or six persons ...
Weekly Expenditure (shillings)
Seven or more persons ...
Weekly Expenditure (shillings)
Under 30/-
Weekly Income Per capita t
3o/- to 50/-
3"8
(75 "4)
50/- to 80/- 80/-- and over
4"4
(331"2)
3"7
(229 ’9)
3"3
(358"3)
... IO’7
¯ .. (44"9)
¯ .. 5"4
¯ .. (92"Ii
... 1’8
¯ .. (135 ’3)
¯ .. 2’0
¯ .. (I75 "3)
NOTES ON TABLE B
x. Source : Household Budget Inquiry, 1951-52, Pr. 2520, Dublin, 1954.
2. In the material as published there is not a special breakdown showing the expenditure pattern of owner occupiers
as distinct from tenants. We are, however, told the proportion of owner occupiers in each Income Group though not also with
respect to size of Household: some io.4 per cent. of Households in the below 3o/- Income Group, 16"4 per cent. in the ~o/to 5o/- Group, ~7"2 per cent. in the 5o/-- to 8o/- Group and 37"9 per cent. in the Group with average incomes greater than --
(Table X of the Report). To obtain the figures given in Table B the expenditure on Rates given in Table 6A of the Report has
been grossed up by coefficients corresponding to the proportion of owner occupiers in each income group. This is a very crude
method but the material does not permit any other approach.
6. There is little evidence of progressiveness in burdens set out in Table B should be revised\
the Table. The best broad interpretation would be upwards in order to get at approximate figures of
that rates are proportional to expenditure rather the rate burden in 1959/6o ; doing this forthe final
than either regressive or progressive. The second column of the Table we get, reading downwards,
point to notice and particularly when bearing in the following percentages: 4"5 per cent., 4’o per
mind the figures with respect to farms that we cent., 3"5 per cent., and 2’7 per cent.
noticed above is the relatively low proportion of
expenditure going in rates with these nonrural :
households, particularly at the higher levels. A 8. Table C below sets out the relationships
third point to notice is the vertical comparison, between expenditure and rents (inclusive of rates)
¯ It is often said in theoretical terms that the relative for tenants in a similar way as Table B set out the
burden of rates increases with the size of family,
rate burden with respect to expenditure for owner
It is, of course, true that averages of this type may occupiers. If, as is probable, there is a fairly good
conceal important instances of this but there is no relationship between gross rents payable and rates
evidence of this in the material, payable the position as regards progressiveness re-
4The figures should indeed bo treated with extreme caution vealed in Table C is very similar to that revealed in
and used only as indicators of the broad order of magnitude : Table B.see Notes to Table B.
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TABLR C: RENTS (INCLUSIVE OF RATES): AS % OF EXPENDITURE: TENANTS ONLY.
Size of Household
One or two persons ...
Three or four persons
Five or six persons.
Seven or eight persons
Weekly Income Per Caln’ta
Under 3o/~ 30/- to 5o/- 50/- to 80/- 8o/-- and overi
IO~I .~ " 9"8 9"3 9"4 i
6"9 6"7 6-6 5.6
6"i 4"7 " "I ’ ¯ 3"7
5"Z 4.0 3"3 3"8
Notes with respect to Table B all apply.
9" One final comparison. At the aggregate level it
is possible to make some very broad comparisons
using National Accounting Material. In 1959/6o it
is probable that about £8¶6 million was contributed
in the form of rates by :: farmers,s The national
income figure for the gross profits and wages in
the agricultural, forestry;and fishing sector averaged
about £x3o million in 1959 and I96o. Thus about
6"3 per cent of gross farming income (before
deduction of rates) went in payment of rates.e
’An official estimate for x958/59 gave £8 million as the rate
burden on farmers (Dail Reports, xo/z/x96o, Vol. x79, Cqlfl.
54-r56). Applying the appropriate multiplier to the x959/oo
figures would give an estimate of £8.6 million.
=The agriculture percentage of 6"3 is with respect to Total
Income. If subsistence n0n-cash income is excluded the
burden with respect to agricultural cash income becomes
about 9 per cent. National Accounting data is taken from
National Income and Expenditure, x96o, Pr. 6z3o, x96x. The
6"3 and 9"0 percentages mentioned above slightly under-
estimate the burden on farmers as the National Accounting
data used as the denominator in the ratios includes a small
amount of income attributable to fishing and forestry.
IO. AS regards the rest of the economy rates
amounted to £z2.6 million. It is not easy to be
certainwhat is the exact figure with which this
should be compared as part of the burden falls on
business and part--by far the bigger part falls
on the ordinary citizen in his capacity of householder.
If we relate the £12.6 million to the total domestic
income arising outside the agricultural sector then
the burden of rates is about 3"4 per cent. This,
however, may be too small. If we relate it not to the
total domestic product but to wages and profits
only we get a figure of about 3"6 per cent. The
point it is desired to bring out is the difference
between the average burden falling on agricultural
income and the burden with respect to the rest of
the economy. Broadly speaking it would seem that
agricultural income bears a burden over 5° per
cent, higher than n0n-farming income; and average
farming incomes were a good deal below those of
the non-farming sector.
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